Models of propositional content by Mack, Eric  A
MODELS OF PROPOSITIONAL CONTENT
BY
ERIC ALAN MACK
DISSERTATION
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy
in the Graduate College of the
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2016
Urbana, Illinois
Doctoral Committee:
Associate Professor Daniel Korman, Chair
Professor Timothy McCarthy
Professor Peter Lasersohn
Lecturer Brian Rabern, University of Ediburgh
ABSTRACT
Propositions, in addition to being the things that sentences express relative to con-
texts of utterance, can be invoked to play a few theoretical roles: since a sentence
seems to be true just in case it expresss a true proposition, propositions could be seen
the primary bearers of truth and falsity; since sentences can be said to be necessar-
ily or possibly true in virtue of expressing necessarily or possibly true propositions,
propositions could be seen as being the primary bearers of modal properties; since
it is possible to know what someone said, propositions would be the things that we
are properly said to know. Propositions are of deep philosophical interest mostly due
to the fact that each of these four theoretical roles involves a perennial philosophical
subject—meaning, truth, modality, and knowledge. There should be no surprise that
philosophers are intent on analyzing and understanding propositions.
Of course, merely specifying a list of philosophically interesting theoretical roles
does not suffice as an analysis. Other than the fact that propositions play these theo-
retical roles, they seem to be mysterious place-holders. What precisely are the things
that can be simultaneously expressed by a sentence, true, necessary, and known? One
ambition of a theory of propositional content is to point to a class of entities that can
be modeled in a way that satisfies the philosophical demands of each of these roles.
To this end, I provide a novel theory of propositional content and show that it yields
solutions to problems plaguing its competitors. Based on a generalization of standard
intensional models, I develop a formal framework in which propositions are identified
with partitions of sets of possible worlds.
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Chapter 1
INDIVIDUATING
PROPOSITIONS
It isn’t that they can’t see the
solution.
It is that they can’t see the
problem.
Gilbert Keith Chesterton,
1874—1936
1.0
In this chapter we explore various philosophical motivations and prospects for a theory
of propositional content.
1.1 Theoretical Roles
Propositions, in addition to being the things that sentences express relative to con-
texts of utterance, can be invoked to play a few theoretical roles: since a sentence
seems to be true just in case it expresss a true proposition, propositions could be seen
the primary bearers of truth and falsity; since sentences can be said to be necessar-
1
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ily or possibly true in virtue of expressing necessarily or possibly true propositions,
propositions could be seen as being the primary bearers of modal properties; since
it is possible to know what someone said, propositions would be the things that we
are properly said to know. Propositions are of deep philosophical interest mostly due
to the fact that each of these four theoretical roles involves a perennial philosophical
subject—meaning, truth, modality, and knowledge. There should be no surprise that
philosophers are intent on analyzing and understanding propositions.
Of course, merely specifying a list of philosophically interesting theoretical roles
does not suffice as an analysis. Other than the fact that propositions play these theo-
retical roles, they seem to be mysterious place-holders. What precisely are the things
that can be simultaneously expressed by a sentence, true, necessary, and known? One
ambition of a theory of propositional content is to point to a class of entities that
can be modeled in a way that satisfies the philosophical demands of each of these
roles. For illustration, suppose these entities were just sentences. Then, the existence
of propositions would be no more controversial or mysterious than the existence of
sentences. Unfortunately, this proposal fails to meet a basic constraint on a theory
of meaning: sometimes, relative to contexts, distinct sentences can mean same thing.
The sentences ‘Bill likes Sue’ and ‘Sue is liked by Bill’, for instance, express the same
propositional content. If propositions were sentences, there would seem to be no way
to account for this fact unless the identity relation for sentences depends on some
prior commitment to propositional content—i.e. ‘Bill likes Sue’ and ‘Sue is liked by
Bill’ are identical sentences (despite their surface appearance) in virtue of expressing
the same proposition. But then, identifying propositions with sentences does not
eliminate any mystery about the nature of propositions. Rather, sentences come to
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be more mysterious than we might previously have thought.1
The question ‘what is the nature of propositions?’ is very general and does not
suggest any obvious method for finding a satisfactory answer. But the fact that there
seems to be a many-one relation between sentences and propositional contents raises a
somewhat more precise question: under what conditions do distinct sentences express
the same proposition? This is a question about the identity conditions of propositions.
In the same way that we would like to know the conditions under which a person at
time t1 is the same as a person at time t2, we would like to know the conditions
under which a proposition expressed by sentence s1 is identical to the proposition
expressed by sentence s2. The question of trans-sentential identity of propositions is
a useful starting point for a metaphysical understanding of propositions in the same
way that the question of trans-temporal identity conditions for persons is a useful
starting point for a metaphysical understanding of persons.2
Propositions induce some equivalence relation (that is not simply identity) on the
set of sentences, and this fact suggests a useful dataset against which to evaluate
our metaphysical theories of propositions—namely our intuitive judgments about the
conditions under which distinct sentences express the same proposition. Any ade-
quate theory of propositions should respect, if not predict, our intuitive judgments
about sameness of meaning across sentences.
However, even though the question of cross-sentential sameness of meaning is a
useful entering wedge for an adequate metaphysical theory of propositions, it fea-
1Quine (1986, chapter 1) provides an inductive argument for letting sentences play the role of
propositions. Rather than belaboring the problems with this proposal, the first two chapters here
will focus on reasons to think that the inductive argument is not cogent.
2Moreover, if Quine (1969, 23) is correct there is “no entity without identity”, intelligible identity
conditions are perhaps more important than merely providing a useful starting point for metaphys-
ical understanding.
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tures the quasi-technical notion of meaning at center stage. In challenging cases, our
judgments tend to be theory-driven, as they are in challenging cases about personal
identity over time. So, one methodological desideratum is to find ways of approaching
the sameness of meaning question indirectly, by discussing various approximations of
meaning. Instead of talking directly about sameness of meaning, we can talk directly
about necessary conditions for sameness of meaning. Moreover, we can extract these
necessary conditions from the other theoretical roles usually assigned to propositions.
Consider, for example, the claim that propositions are the primary bearers of truth
and falsity. We can translate this into a necessary condition for sameness of proposi-
tional content across sentences: two sentences express the same propositional content
relative to a context only if they have the same truth value. This condition is trivial,
but it is a start. For example, any theory that results in ‘Obama is President’ and
‘Biden is President’ expressing the same proposition is disqualified because it fails
this trivial necessary condition for sameness of meaning.
Similarly, consider, the claim that propositions are the primary bearers of modal
properties like necessary truth and possible truth. This theoretical role suggests the
following necessary condition for sameness of propositional content across sentences:
two sentences express the same propositional content (relative to a context) only if
they have the same modal profile. Hence any theory according to which ‘chordates are
things with a heart’ expresses the same propositional content as ‘renates are things
with a heart’ is disqualified. The question of whether sameness of modal profile con-
stitutes a necessary and sufficient condition for sameness of propositional content will
take up a large portion of the present chapter, but for now the point is that it can be
wielded as at least a necessary condition.
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If a theory that is supposed to respect, if not predict, our judgments about
the sameness of meaning across sentences is not disqualified by these two necessary
conditions—sameness of truth value and sameness of modal profile—then it might still
be ruled out by a further constraint. Consider the claim that propositions are the
proper objects of knowledge. Then, of course, they are the objects of belief, assuming
one must believe what one knows.3 This theoretical role translates into the following
powerful necessary condition for sameness of propositional content across sentences:
two sentences express the same propositional content (relative to a context) only if
it is impossible to believe one without also believing the other.4 At face value, this
condition is even stronger than the previous condition; it seems that two sentences
have have the same modal profile while it is possible to believe one without believing
the other—this question will also take up a significant portion of this chapter.
It might be objected that the original formulation of the sameness of proposi-
tional content question—‘under what conditions do two sentences express the same
thing?’—is really the same as the question of when two sentences are interchangeable
in the complements of belief ascriptions, the latter is just the former in disguise. But
this is not quite correct. First of all, there is an important methodological difference
between the two. In considering relations between belief ascriptions, rather than rela-
tions between sentence contents, one is able to leverage two things: (i) The question
becomes one about strict implications between sentences—i.e. necessarily, ‘S believes
3The assumption that knowledge entails belief will not be too important for our purposes until
chapter 4. Although it has a canonical status in epistemology, see Murray et al. (2013) for some
reasons to think this entailment doesn’t hold.
4Note that the translation of each of the three theoretical roles for propositions into their corre-
sponding necessary conditions for sameness of propositional content depends implicitly on Leibniz’
law. Hence, if P is true, and P = Q then Q must also be true; if P is necessarily true, and P = Q,
then Q must also be necessarily true; if an agent S believes that P and P = Q, then S believes Q.
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that P’ is true just in case ‘S believes that Q’ is true—which leverages intuitions
about what necessarily entails what, rather than asking directly about whether two
sentences have identical meanings.5 (ii) Thinking about strict entailment patterns
between belief ascriptions leverages an independent stock of intuitions about mental
attitudes.
Secondly, interchangeability of sentences salva veritate in belief contexts is not
obviously sufficient for sameness of propositional content. It is worth pointing out
that, for Frege, strict entailment between belief ascriptions was a necessary and a
sufficient condition for sameness of meaning.6 The necessity claim, assuming that
propositions are the proper objects of belief, is just an instance of Leibniz’s law. The
sufficiency claim is more substantive. Intuitively there could be pairs of sentences ex-
pressing distinct propositions which are such that no possible epistemic agent could
believe one and not the other (e.g ‘I exist’ and ‘Something exists’). For all intents and
purposes, we will be operating as if Frege were correct about interchangeability in
belief contexts being sufficient for sameness of propositional contents across distinct
sentences. For the most part, Frege’s criterion predicts the intuitively correct results,
so it is useful for gauging whether or not a theory is on the right track.
The remainder of the present chapter is dedicated to the question of whether
sameness of modal profile is a sufficient, rather than merely necessary, condition for
sameness of propositional content. In particular, if the interchangeability of two sen-
tences in belief contexts is a necessary condition for sameness of propositional content,
5Kaplan (1999, 33:30) points out that most of us tend to have more stable intuitions about logical
consequence than about truth.
6“Now two sentences A and B can stand in such a [synonymy] relation that anyone who recognizes
the content of A as true must thereby also recognize the content of B as true and, conversely, that
anyone who accepts the content of B must straightaway accept that of A” Frege (1906).
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doesn’t this present a conflict for the claim that sameness of modal profile suffices
for sameness of propositional content? The goal of the present chapter is to argue
for an affirmative answer to this question, but also to argue that problems associated
with the modal profile view—in particular, the problems of logical omniscience, and
problems having to do with direct reference—have been exaggerated in a way that
covers over some important distinctions. With a clarification of the problems in view,
we will be in a position to develop an alternative account that meets a well-defined set
of constraints and desiderata. Before that, we will have a look at some philosophical
motivations for identifying the proposition a sentence expresses with that sentence’s
modal profile, i.e. its distribution of truth values across the set of all possible worlds.
1.2 Possible Worlds Propositions
In the previous section, it was noted that one of the theoretical roles assigned to
propositions is to be the primary bearers of modal properties—that is, the modal
profile of a proposition determines the modal profile of any sentence expressing that
proposition. This entails that two sentences express the same proposition only if those
sentences have the same modal profile. If this were also a sufficient condition—i.e. any
two sentences with the same modal profiles express the same proposition—this would
suggest an outright identification of propositions with truth conditions: a proposition
just is the set of conditions relative to which a sentence can be evaluated as true
or false. Even more directly: a proposition is identical to a set of circumstances, or
possible worlds. This is a familiar characterization of propositions, and the problems
it raises are well-known.
But, recognizing that propositions have to be individuated at least truth-conditionally—
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which is to say that two sentences cannot express the same proposition if they do not
share truth values in all possible worlds—is a somewhat weak motivation for an out-
right identification between propositions and truth conditions. There are at least two
other ways of motivating this identification. First, there is a sense in which truth-
conditions, modeled as sets of possible worlds, are able to play at least some of the
theoretical roles we have allocated for propositions. Consider the role of being the
primary bearers of truth. A proposition, on the truth-conditional view, is true just
in case our world is a member (in the set-theoretic sense) of that proposition. To
say that the sentence ‘Grass is green’ is true is to say that the proposition that it
expresses is true, which is to say that our world is a member of the set of worlds
in which grass is green. Concerning modal properties, there is a familiar story to
tell about what constitutes, for example, a proposition’s being necessary: it contains
all possible worlds. So, another motivation for identifying propositions with truth-
conditions, modeled as sets of possible worlds, comes from the sense it which sets of
possible worlds play some of the roles allocated to propositions.
There is a further principled motivation for identifying propositions with sets of
possible worlds. Even if it is possible to make a convincing case that sets of possible
worlds can be the primary bearers of truth and the primary bearers of modal proper-
ties, letting them be the objects of propositional attitudes seems, at least prima facie,
to be more of a theoretical artifact than a happy prediction. But this might be due
to an insufficiently clear understanding of what it is for an agent to hold an attitude
toward a proposition, rather than some defect with the identification of propositions
with sets of possible worlds.
Although not uncontroversial, we will suppose first of all that the propositional
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attitudes are relational and that the relata are agents and propositions—call this the
relational account of propositions. According to the relational account, a belief ascrip-
tion ‘S believes that P ’ is true just in case the agent S stands in the belief relation to
the propositional referent of the complement clause; a knowledge ascription ‘S knows
that P ’ is true just in case S stands in the knowledge relation to the propositional
referent of the complement clause. The relational account is by no means the only
option available for modeling propositional attitude ascriptions—alternatives to the
relational account usually posit some intermediate vehicle of representation between
the agent and the referent of the complement, but we will set these alternatives aside
since the relational view is still alive and well in the propositional attitudes litera-
ture.7
Even if the relational account of propositional attitudes makes a non-trivial sub-
stantive claim about the truth conditions of propositional attitude ascriptions, it is
still not very informative. At least prior to a clear characterization of propositional
contents, the relation that obtains when an agent holds an attitude toward a propo-
sition is somewhat mysterious. If propositions are non-mental, non-physical entities,
then what is it for an agent to stand in, say, the belief relation to a proposition?
Identifying propositions with sets of possible worlds seems to make the question even
more challenging. How can an agent stand in an attitudinal relation to an abstract
set of possibilities? Frege, for one, was comfortable with positing a grasping relation
between epistemic agents and abstract senses expressed by sentences. Holding any
propositional attitude, for Frege, entails first that the grasping relation obtains—so
7Although for an example of a non-relational theory of propositional attitude reports, see Moltmann
(2003) which contains a defense of a Russellian “multiple-relation” theory of belief, originating in
Russell (1912), Russell (1913), and Russell (1918).
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in this sense grasping is seen to be fundamental among the attitudes.8
But the naturalistically inclined have found the Fregean grasping relation mysteri-
ous. Moreover, if Fregean senses are modeled with (or supplanted by) sets of possible
worlds, it seems impossible to make sense of grasping in naturalistically respectable
terms.
However, a causal account of propositional attitudes, whose chief defender is
Robert Stalnaker, is surprising congenial for advocates of the possible worlds propo-
sitions. The so-called “causal-pragmatic” account aspires to characterize belief states
and desire states as special instances of representational states. Here is Stalnaker’s
summary of the causal-pragmatic account of belief and desire in Stalnaker (1984, 7):
The strategy I have in mind is the one suggested by the pragmatic picture
of mental acts and attitudes. Belief and desire, the strategy suggests, are
correlative dispositional states of a potentially rational agent. To desire
that P is to be disposed to act in ways that would tend to bring it about
that P in a world in which one’s beliefs, whatever they are, were true. To
believe that P is to be disposed to act in ways that would tend to satisfy
one’s desires, whatever they are, in a world in which P (together with
one’s other beliefs) were true.
The causal-pragmatic account presupposes that representation—a relation common
to all propositional attitude states—is a special kind of causal relation, involving a
disposition to be in certain states in response to environmental conditions. For il-
lustration, an agent’s environment can be in one of n possible states (E1, ..., En).
8In the following passage, Frege quite poetically describes the non-physical grasping relation: “[S]ince
the answer lies in the non-sensible, perhaps something non-sensible could also lead us out of the
inner world and enable us to grasp thoughts where no sense-impressions were involved. Outside
one’s inner world one would have to distinguish the proper outer world of sensible, perceptible
things from the realm of the nonsensibly perceptible. We should need something non-sensible for
the recognition of both realms but for the sensible perception of things we should need sense-
impressions as well and these belong entirely to the inner world.” Frege (1956, 309)
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What is it for an agent to represent its environment? Under ideal conditions the
agent can be in one of n corresponding states (O1,...,On) which are counterfactually
correlated to the respective environmental states—“for each i, the organism will be in
state Oi if and only if the environment is in state Ei [where the] if and only if is causal
[...].”9 So, the representation relation featuring in Stalnaker’s causal-pragmatic ac-
count is a relation of counterfactual correspondence. Representational mental states,
like belief and desire, are thought of as special instances of the more general causal
representational relation. The pragmatic aspect of the causal-pragmatic account is
its characterization of belief in terms of desire, and vice versa.
Here are some observations about the causal-pragmatic representation relation.
First, it makes sense to call the relation representational insofar as counterfactual
correlation (causal or not) between the states of a system and corresponding states
of its environment underlies a kind of indication relation in the following sense: If
a system is disposed to be in one of n states depending on whether its environment
is in a corresponding state, then that system’s state indicates a fact about its envi-
ronment. For illustration, the states of a barometer represent atmospheric pressure
insofar as its states indicate—under certain idealized conditions—the surrounding at-
mospheric pressure. We take this instance of the indication to be reliable just in case
the states are counterfactually correlated with corresponding environmental states
of atmospheric pressure. On the causal-pragmatic account there is nothing special
about representational states—they do not involve any particularly mysterious irre-
ducibly mental aspect. In a concise statement: representation just is counterfactual
correlation because counterfactual correlation involves indication. It should be noted
9See Stalnaker (1986, 114—115).
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that the representation relation need not be manifested in observable behavior. A
system can be disposed to take on states that are counterfactually dependent on its
environment, even if those states are merely internal states.
How then do we get from the causal-pragmatic account of the propositional atti-
tudes to the claim that propositions are identifiable with truth conditions? Consider
again what the latter claim predicts about the individuation of propositions over
distinct sentences: two sentences are true (relative to a context) in the same set of
possible worlds if and only if those sentences express the same proposition. Since
propositions certainly are not more coarsely individuated than truth conditions, the
“only if” direction of this biconditional is what should derive motivation from the
causal-pragmatic account of the attitudes. If anything, we would be inclined to think
that truth conditions are too coarse to be identified with propositional contents. In-
deed, the causal-pragmatic account of the attitudes suggests that propositions are no
more fine-grained than truth conditions.
The reason the causal-pragmatic account suggests a coarse-grained individuation
of propositions across sentences is the fact that it is formulated in terms of the causal
relation of representation, which is itself a special case of the relation of indication—a
non-hyperintensional relation. That is, for a representational system s, if ‘s indicates
that P ’ is true, and P is truth-conditionally equivalent to Q, then ‘s indicates that
Q’ is also true. It is precisely the fact that indication is understood in terms of coun-
terfactual causal correspondence with possible environmental states that it is a non-
hyperintensional relation. If, as the causal-pragmatic account entails, belief is merely
a special case of the more general indication relation, then belief itself would also be a
non-hyperintensional relation. Hence, one of chief reasons for doubting that proposi-
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tions are sets of possible worlds—the thought that belief must be hyperintensional—is
false according to the causal-pragmatic account. Since our pre-theoretic judgments
about entailment patterns between propositional attitude ascriptions is supposed to
be the primary source of data undermining coarse-grained propositions, this evidence
should either be set aside or explained away if the causal-pragmatic account is true.
So, there are plenty of philosophical motivations for the identification between
propositions and truth-conditions modeled as sets of possible worlds.10 Before con-
sidering the primary objections to this view of propositions, it will be useful to point
out some of the theoretical desiderata that are also respected by the possible worlds
account of propositions. First, possible worlds propositions are language-independent
entities. The content of a sentence should not be contaminated with the syntactic
structure of that sentence. After all, there is no guarantee that distinct sentences
expressing the same proposition will share the relevant syntactic structure. More im-
portantly, by involving linguistic structure in propositional contents the line between
form/content distinction is lost. There could be pairs of individuals who believe the
same content, but whose languages differ—perhaps one member of the pair is an an-
imal which lacks anything resembling human language.11
In the following section two of the most familiar objections to possible worlds
propositions are considered and refined. Some of the common alternatives to possible
worlds propositions are considered in the following chapter, where it is shown that
certain desiderata that are met by possible worlds propositions are sacrificed for the
sake of solving these two problems. The reason for belaboring the motivations for
10Stalnaker (1976) grants that a reduction of possible worlds to propositions is possible, although,
he argues, a reduction in the opposite direction is preferable.
11cf Chapter 2.
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possible worlds propositions is, in part, to promote an alternative to the possible
worlds account, which is derived from the same set of motivations, but nevertheless
circumvents the two objections in the following section.
1.3 Some Problems
Despite the fact that possible worlds propositions seem to be recommended by both
the theoretical roles allocated to propositions and the causal-pragmatic account of
propositional attitudes, they are undermined by our intuitions concerning entailment
patterns between pairs of propositional attitude ascriptions. The main objective
for this section is to refine these objections in a way that reveals the philosophical
commitments that must be preserved by any adequate solution.
1.3.1 Logical Omniscience
Propositional attitudes like belief and knowledge do not seem to be closed under
strict entailment.12 But if propositions are sets of possible worlds, and propositional
attitude ascriptions are true just in case their subject stands in the appropriate atti-
tude relation to the proposition expressed by the complement clause, then it follows
necessarily that propositional attitudes are closed under strict entailment (at least if
Leibniz’s law applies to propositional attitude predicates). This is perhaps the most
familiar instance of the problem of logical omniscience.13 This quick formulation of
12We will say that a sentence S strictly entails a sentence S′ just in case all possible worlds in which
S is true are worlds in which S′ is true.
13The “problem of logical omniscience” is a misnomer because, strictly speaking, the “logical” conse-
quences of a proposition constitute only a proper subset of the strict entailments (truth-conditional
consequences) of a proposition. Nevertheless, we’ll use the label in a way that covers over this
distinction.
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the problem of logical omniscience applies not just to possible worlds propositions,
but to any characterization of propositions such that they are individuated truth-
conditionally. But other phenomena that fall under the same category do require
possible worlds propositions. Here is a list of related problems, which all fall under
the general category of problems of logical omniscience (using belief as our represen-
tative propositional attitude):14
(1) If ‘S believes that P ’ is true, and P strictly entails Q, then ‘S believes that
Q’ is true.
(2) If ‘S believes that P ’ is true, and P and Q strictly entail each other, then ‘S
believes that Q’ is true.
(3) If S holds any beliefs at all, S must believe all necessary truths.
(4) If ‘S believes ⊥’ is true for any necessary falsity ⊥, then, for all P ‘S believes
that P ’ is true.
In fact, (2) is the only instance of the problem of logical omniscience on this list that
is independent of the possible-worlds model of propositions. Notice that (2)—(4) are
all consequences of (1), which itself is derivable from the identification of possible
worlds with truth conditions.
There are two methods that are typically used to derive (1) from possible worlds
propositions. The first, and likely the most familiar derivation, comes from Jakko
Hintikka’s analysis of belief predicates BS(x) (representing “S believes that x” in
which x is a sentential variable) as quantifiers over domains of possible worlds:15
14See Jago (2012) and Halpern and Pucella (2007) for a more thorough survey of various problems
falling under the category of “logical omniscience” problems.
15This analysis was developed in Hintikka (1962) and generalized to cover other propositional atti-
tudes in Hintikka (1969)
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(Belief) For all S and P : BS(P ) ⇔ P is true in all possible worlds com-
patible with S’s beliefs.
It is not hard to see that whenever P strictly entails Q, believing that P entails
believing that Q, according to (Belief). So, taking propositional attitude predicates
to be Hintikka-style quantifiers over possible worlds means accepting all of (1)—(4).
But, stepping back a bit, even if one rejects Hintikka’s quantificational analysis
of belief, it is possible to show that, indeed, any relational account of belief in which
the second relatum is taken to be a set of possible worlds must be closed under strict
entailment. Note that the possible worlds proposition expressed by a conjunction
is the set-theoretic intersection of the possible worlds propositions expressed by the
conjuncts—a conjunction is true at a possible world just in case both of its conjuncts
are true. Moreover, the belief predicate seems to distribute over conjunction in the
following sense: if ‘S believes that P and Q’, then ‘S believes that P ’ is true as well
as ‘S believes that Q.’ Granting both of these assumptions, and supposing that P
strictly entails Q, if ‘S believes that P ’ is true, then so is ‘S believes that P and
Q’. By distributivity of belief, it follows that ‘S believes that Q’ is true. So, the
problems of logical omniscience (1)—(4) are independent of the familiar Hintikka-
style quantificational analysis of belief predicates. Strictly speaking, the only thing
we need to presuppose is the possible worlds theory of propositions, the relational
analysis of belief, that conjunction is set-theoretic intersection, and distributivity of
belief over conjunction.16
It is easy to focus only on the prima facie unhappy consequences of (1)—(4), but
there is also a sense in which the set-theoretic structure of propositions generates some
16Note that even if distributivity is rejected, the intermediate conclusion of the foregoing argument
is damning enough—the fact that ‘S believes that P ’ is true should not intuitively necessitate that
‘S believes P and Q’ is true for all strict entailments Q of P .
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desirable predictions. For example, it seems necessary that belief in a conjunction
‘A ∧ B’ entails a belief in the permuted conjunction ‘B ∧ A’. The fact that the
truth conditions of both conjunctions are the same means that the possible worlds
propositions expressed are the same—so a belief in one entails a belief in the other.
Likewise, with disjunction. These trivial predictions do not necessarily follow from
just any theory of propositions. This is one desirable output of maintaining a strict
distinction between linguistic form and linguistic content, which, if nothing else, the
possible worlds theory of propositions does exceedingly well.
On the other hand, however, there are plenty of unhappy consequences of (1)—
(4). If S believes that grass is green, it does not intuitively follow that S therefore
believes that either grass is green or Obama is the president—perhaps S has never
heard of Obama, or is incapable of grasping the concept of president in the first place.
But, according to (1), if S believes the former, then S believes the latter. Consider
a prediction of (2): if S believes that grass is green, then S believes that either
grass is green or Obama is president and Obama isn’t president (since the latter is
truth-conditionally equivalent to the sentence ‘Grass is green’). Consider (3). Surely
it is possible for an epistemic agent to fail to believe some necessary truths. More
precisely, it is possible that there is a sentence φ that expresses a necessary truth,
such that for some agent S, ‘S believes that φ’ is false. For instance, one’s belief
that grass is green does not seem to necessitate that one also believes that one also
believes all theorems of Peano Arithmetic. (4) falsely predicts that one cannot make
a logical error without thereby believing absolutely every proposition.
One possible response to these consequences of (1)—(4) is to point out that an
agent’s being disposed to honestly reject a particular sentence is not a foolproof
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guide to whether or not the agent really holds belief in question. That is, even if the
following disquotation principle is true:
(Disquotation) If a normal English speaker, on reflection, sincerely as-
sents to ‘P ’, then he believes that P .
the corresponding biconditional is not:
(Biconditional Disaquotation) A normal English speaker who is not
reticent will be disposed to sincere reflective assent to ‘P ’ if and only if
he believes that P .17
In order to see why, let’s suppose that substituting proper names in a sentence does
not affect the content that the sentence expresses. Richard (1983) presents a case in
which sincere reflective rejection of a sentence would not necessitate a corresponding
failure to believe: Sally is in a phone booth speaking to Bill, but does not realize
that the person in the phone booth across the street is Bill. Sally sees a steamroller
headed toward the phone booth across the street and waves to the person (Bill) in the
phone both, communicating that she thinks he is in danger. Bill (speaking to Sally)
says that the woman across the street believes that I am in danger. Sally infers that
the woman across the street believes that Bill is in danger. At the same time, Sally
is disposed to sincerely deny that she believes that Bill is in danger. But, Sally is
the woman across the street waving to Bill. Hence, Sally is disposed to sincerely and
reflectively reject a sentence (‘I believe that Bill is in danger’) the content of which she,
by stipulation, believes. This case seems to show that (Biconditional Disquotation)
is false.
The question, then, would be whether the apparent counterexamples to (1)—(4)
depend implicitly on (Biconditional Disquotation). It would appear not. In all the
17This formulation is borrowed from Kripke (1979).
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proposed counterexamples to (1)—(4), the failure of the relevant entailment patterns
seems to be due to the contents of the constituents of the sentences in question. The
reason it seems possible for one to believe the content of ‘Grass is green’ while not
believing the content of ‘Grass is green or Obama is president and he isn’t president’
has to be due to the fact that one sentence is simply about the greenness of grass,
while the other is about the greenness of grass and the presidential status of Obama.
There is no implicit assumption that the subjects of any of these belief ascriptions are
disposed to any particular assent/dissent behavior. But that means that appealing
to the falsity of (Biconditional Disquotation) is unhelpful with respect to these cases.
If the counterexamples to (1)—(4) all depend on the fact the entailed beliefs
are intuitively about something other than what the original beliefs are about, then
perhaps this could do some work in distinguishing the favorable consequences of (1)—
(4) from the unfavorable ones. Consider a case in which we hold fixed whatever it
is that a sentence is intuitively about, and instead pile on some arbitrary amount of
logical complexity:
(5) a. The Earth is round.
b. Either the Earth is round and the Earth is not round, or the Earth is
round.
For a case like this it is not hard to imagine an agent who accepts the sentence (5a) who
rejects the sentence (5b). But it is implausible to think that an agent could believe
the content of (5a) without thereby believing the content of (5b). In other words,
with respect to (5a) and (5b), it is not hard to imagine cases that are candidate
counterexamples to (Biconditional Disquotation)—an agent might well accept one
while rejecting the other, but it does not thereby make us think that an agent can
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believe the content of one without believing the content of the other.
This raises a question. What is it about cases like (5a) and (5b)—pairs of sentences
whose atomic constituents are identical—that explains why they are at least more
easily interchangeable in belief contexts than are arbitrary pairs of logically equivalent
sentences? One plausible explanation would be that since there is no difference in the
atomic constituents between (5a) and (5b), there simply can be no difference in what
the sentences are intuitively about.18 Both (5a) and (5b) are about the roundness of
the Earth. And, since there is also no change in truth conditions between (5a) and
(5b), we find them to be much more plausibly interchangeable than just any old pair
of logically equivalent sentences.
Why should we say that the sentences (5a) and (5b) really are intuitively about
the same thing? After all, they are syntactically very distinct from one another:
one contains a conjunction and a negation and a disjunction, while the other has no
logical expressions. Here is why this is a bad reason to attribute distinct contents
to (5a) and (5b). If (5a) and (5b) have distinct contents in virtue of their distinct
logical structure, then it seems that there would have to be an explanation for cases
in which syntactic structure is distinct but where the identity of content is virtually
undeniable. Consider, for instance, the follow pair:
(6) a. Bill likes Sue.
b. Sue is liked by Bill.
But, if there can be syntactically distinct sentences that are identical in content, then
there must be some explanation of why pairs (5a) and (5b) succeed in expressing
18In general we should at a qualification about context here—“there can be no difference in what
the sentences are intuitively about, relative to a context.” (5a) and (5b) do not have any paradigm
contextually sensitive expressions, but the qualification is necessary for pairs of sentences whose
atomic constituents contain contextually sensitive expressions.
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distinct contents (that is, given that the reader does not share the intuition that (5a)
and (5b) are interchangeable in belief contexts). Suppose, then, that the distinction
(between pairs like (5a)/(5b) versus pairs like (6a)/(6b)) has to do with the fact that,
while (6a) and (6b) have distinct syntactic structure, (5a) and (5b) have distinct logi-
cal structure. This sort of reasoning presupposes that there is a hard line to be drawn
between differences in mere syntactic structure versus differences in logical structure,
but this is not what’s wrong with the reasoning. The problem is that even if one
thinks of the logical constants as being special cases of so-called “syncategorematic”
expressions—expressions having no individual meanings—then a change in logical
structure introducing distinct logical constants (such as in the case of (5a) and (5b))
would seem to be incapable of inducing a change in content.19 If this is correct, then
it follows that introducing arbitrary logical complexity (such as in the case of (5a)
and (5b)) preserves content, at least insofar as the new complexity does not change
truth conditions. This explains the intuition one might have that arbitrarily complex
logical reformulations of a simple sentence can be substituted in belief contexts salva
veritate—the possible inappropriateness of actually doing so could be accounted for
in Gricean terms.20 Moreover, the falsity of (Biconditional Disquotation) would allow
for the possibility of an agent rejecting an arbitrarily complex sentence, while never-
theless believing its content.
If these considerations are correct, then under the condition that truth conditions
as well as the atomic constituents occurring in sentences are held fixed, the resulting
logical omniscience phenomena are not actually problematic. The truly problematic
19See Peacocke (1976), McCarthy (1981), and MacFarlane (2000) for various ways of understanding
the claim that logical constants are content neutral.
20It is not difficult to construct an explanation of this pragmatic inappropriateness in terms of
flouting the maxim manner in Grice (1975).
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cases arise from logical manipulations that change the set of atomic constituents of a
given sentence—even if such manipulations preserve truth conditions. The problems
of logical omniscience are genuine problems in need of a solution, but the point here
is merely to clarify the problem in order to open the door to a candidate solution.
1.3.2 The Frege-Soames Puzzle
So much for the first perennial challenge to possible worlds propositions. In this
section another equally compelling, although somewhat less familiar, challenge to
possible worlds propositions is explored. The supposition that the semantic value of
proper names and indexicals are their referents leads to a well-known version of Frege’s
puzzle, which involves entailment patterns between propositional attitude ascriptions.
Consider the following principle of compositionality:
(Comp) If S1 and S2 are non-intensional sentences or formulas with the
same grammatical structure, which differ only in the substitution of con-
stituents with the same semantic contents (relative to their respective
contexts and assignments), then the semantic contents of S1 and S2 will
be the same (relative to those contexts and assignments).
For co-referential names or indexical expressions e and e∗, (7a) and (7b) should be
equivalent for all instances of S and P :
(7) a. S believes that P (e).
b. S believes that P (e∗).
But there are instances of S and P for which, intuitively, (7a) is true and (7b) is false.
For example, ‘Louis believes that Superman in strong’ is true, but ‘Louis believes
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that Clark Kent is strong’ is false. Note that this version of Frege’s puzzle does
not depend on any commitment to possible worlds propositions. And for those who
find this version unproblematic, Soames (1987) provides a strengthened version of it
aimed particularly at possible worlds propositions—two premises of which we have
already been assuming: (i) that the semantic contents of names and indexicals are
their referents, and (ii) that a relational account of propositional attitude ascriptions
is true. In addition, assume that (iii) the semantic content of a declarative sentence
is a set of truth-supporting circumstances (possible worlds) in which that sentence is
true, and (iv) that belief distributes over conjunction (as understood in section 3.1
above). Finally, assume that the following is constitutive of conjunction:
(Conj) The set of possible worlds in which a conjunction is true is the
intersection of the sets in which each of its conjuncts are true.
Now, consider the following reductio of these assumptions:
(8) a. The ancients believed that ‘Hesperus’ refers to Hesperus and ’Phosphorus’
refers to Phosphorus. (assumed)
b. The ancients believed that ‘Hesperus’ refers to Phosphorus and ’Phospho-
rus’ refers to Phosphorus. (by (i) and (Comp))
c. The ancients believed that ‘Hesperus’ refers to Phosphorus and ’Phospho-
rus’ refers to Phosphorus, and there is an x such that ‘Hesperus’ refers to
x and ‘Phosphorus’ refers to x. (by (ii) and (Conj))
d. The ancients believed that there is an x such that ‘Hesperus’ refers to x
and ‘Phosphorus’ refers to x. (by (iv))
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Exactly what this reductio counts as a reductio of is not so clear. If one finds the first
version of Frege’s puzzle (the equivalence of all instances of (7a) and (7b)) sufficiently
compelling, then (8a)—(8d) might well be seen as confirmation that (i) must be false.
But since (i) is well-supported by independent Kripkean considerations,21 the culprit
is plausibly something else. Moreover, even if (i) is to blame, it is possible to formu-
late a version of (8a)—(8d) using replacing (i) with the somewhat less contentious
claim that the semantic values of indexical referring expressions (relative to contexts)
are their referents.22
The argument (8a)—(8d) is supposed to illustrate that rigidly designating proper
names, while they might well lead to Frege-style puzzles, present a special challenge
for defenders of possible worlds propositions. After all, (8b) follows from (8a) with-
out appealing to possible worlds propositions—so if this inference is problematic, it
is problematic for anyone holding that ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ rigidly designate
the same object. However, notice that there is a plausible reading of (8b) whereby, if
(8a) is true, so is (8b). Suppose that the speaker and hearer of (8a) are both aware
that ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ both denote Venus. It seems acceptable—or at
least plausible—to infer (8b) from (8a). Notice, however, that there is no such plau-
sible reading of (8d). According to the relevant reading (8b), it does not follow that
the ancients believed there is one object to which ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ refer.
This seems to indicate that, even if rigid designation is problematic for everyone, it
is especially problematic for defenders of possible worlds propositions.
One possible option for blocking this reductio argument is to deny that belief dis-
21Considerations derived primarily from Kripke (1972).
22However, see Elbourne (2010) for some reasons to think that indexical referring expressions have
descriptive content.
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tributes over conjunction, in which case it would be possible to believe a conjunction
without believing both conjuncts individually. If this were the case, the inference
from (8c) to (8d) would be invalid. So what’s wrong with this option? First of all,
it is simply implausible to suggest that an S could believe a conjunction φ ∧ φ while
failing to believe either φ or ψ. It seems to be constitutive of conjunction that belief
distributes over it. If an agent accepts the sentence φ ∧ ψ but fails to belief either φ
or ψ individually, then it is more plausible to infer that this is a counterexample to
(Disquotation) than a case that shows that belief fails to distribute over conjunction.
What about the familiar cases of the preface and the lottery that seem to show that
belief fails to distribute over conjunction? Since this is not the space to evaluate these
cases in any serious way, let’s grant that it is at least plausible that belief fails to
distribute over conjunction, so that the inference from (8c) to (8d) is plausibly the
culprit in the reductio (8a)—(8d). The problem is that (8c), as Soames points out,
is bad enough of a sub-conclusion on its own. So, even granting that belief fails to
distribute over conjunction, the reductio (8a)—(8c) still stands.
Another possible option is to deny (Comp), which is supposed to be relatively
uncontroversial in the context of the other assumptions behind the reductio (8a)—
(8d). This requires making a somewhat ad hoc distinction between truth-supporting
circumstances, on the one hand, and worlds on the other. While it might well be
constitutive of ‘∧’ that φ∧ψ is true in exactly those worlds in which φ is true and ψ
is true, this need not be true of all indices relative to which sentences are evaluated to
truth or falsity. At this point, this sort of solution seems ad hoc and unmotivated. In
chapter 3, I will present a theoretically-motivated distinction of the sort that is needed
for denying (Comp). If successful, this would show that there is no obvious reason to
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think that rigidly designating names present a special challenge to propositions qua
sets of truth-supporting circumstances.
1.4 Summary
We have established two distinct challenges to possible worlds propositions. The
philosophical motivation for identifying propositions with sets of possible worlds will
ultimately be shown to suggest a way out of these challenges. Before that, in the
following chapter we will look at two alternatives to possible worlds propositions and
their respective obstacles. This will help to compile a collection of constraints on an
adequate solution to the challenges raised in the present chapter.
Chapter 2
ADEQUACY CONSTRAINTS
2.0
In the last chapter, a formal theory of propositions was introduced along with its
philosophical motivations. Two distinct problems for it—the logical omniscience phe-
nomena and the Frege-Soames puzzle—seem to call for a more or less fundamental
revision of the theory. In this chapter we briefly explore two leading alternatives to
possible worlds propositions. This will serve both to situate the problems in a larger
philosophical context and to further motivate a solution to the two problems raised
in the last chapter. The correct solution to these problems should preserve the merits
of possible worlds propositions over competing accounts of propositions.
2.1 Impossibilities
The first of the competing accounts of propositions to be explored is a generaliza-
tion of the possible worlds account. According to the generalized version of the
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possible worlds account—endorsed in various forms by Hintikka (1979), Barwise and
Perry (1983), Jago (2012), Jago (2013), Krakauer (2013), and others—propositions
are simply sets of worlds, possible or impossible.1 We will call them impossible worlds
propositions. We have been implicitly assuming thus far that worlds are logically pos-
sible states of affairs relative to which sentences are either true or false, but not both.
An impossible world w is a world that is either incomplete—at least one sentence is
neither true nor false relative to w—or inconsistent—at least one sentence is both
true and false at w. Let f be a function such that for any world w, f(w) is the set
of sentences that are true relative to w. We can provide a corresponding syntactic
characterization of impossible worlds as follows: A world w is said to be negation
complete for all sentences φ, either φ or ¬φ is a member of w. A world w is said to
be syntactically consistent if it does not contain both a sentence and its negation. A
world is impossible if it is either negation incomplete or syntactically inconsistent (or
both). The impossible worlds proposition expressed by a sentence S is the set of all
worlds w such that S is a member of f(w).
Notice, first of all, that impossible worlds propositions need not be as coarsely
individuated as possible worlds propositions. For example, the proposition expressed
by ‘The Earth is flat’ need not be identical to the proposition expressed by ‘The
Earth is flat, and Obama is both president and not president.’ Why? There could be
impossible worlds relative to which the former is true, but the latter is false. Since
truth-conditionally equivalent sentences express identical propositions according to
possible worlds propositions, these two sentences must express the same proposition.
So, impossible worlds propositions are more finely individuated than possible worlds
1Impossible worlds also feature in theories of counterpossibles—counterfactuals with impossible
antecedents—in Nolan et al. (1997) and Brogaard and Salerno (2013), among others.
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propositions. That being the case, defenders of impossible worlds propositions are in
a position to circumvent the following version of the problem of logical omniscience:
since sentences with identical truth conditions need not express the same proposi-
tion, a relational account of propositional attitude ascriptions is saddled with the
result that all pairwise truth-conditionally equivalent sentences are interchangeable
in complement clauses. Other logical omniscience phenomena are taken care of in a
similar way. Propositional attitude predicates that distribute over conjunction are
not necessarily closed under logical consequence because, in general, even if ψ is a
logical consequence of φ, it need not be the case that the impossible worlds proposi-
tion expressed by φ is identical to that expressed by ψ ∧ φ. And so on for the other
logical omniscience phenomena listed in the previous chapter.
This last observation also underlies the solution that impossible worlds offer to
the Frege-Soames puzzle. The inference from premise (10a) to (10b) is valid only if
the set of worlds supporting the truth of the existential generalization of a sentence
is a superset of the set of worlds supporting the truth of the sentence itself. In par-
ticular, the existential generalization of ‘The ancients believed that ‘Hesperous’ refers
to Phosphorus and ‘Phosphorus’ refers to Phosphorus” is the sentence ‘There is an
x such that ‘Hesperus’ refers to x and ‘Phosphorus’ refers to x.’ The set of possible
worlds supporting the truth of the latter is a superset of the set of worlds supporting
the truth of the former. But impossible worlds propositions need not reflect logical
relations as set-theoretic relations. So, the impossible worlds proposition expressed
by ‘There is an x such that ‘Hesperus’ refers to x and ‘Phosphorus’ refers to x.’ need
not be a superset of ‘The ancients believed that ‘Hesperous’ refers to Phosphorus and
‘Phosphorus’ refers to Phosphorus.” That being the case, the intersection of both
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propositions need not be identical to the impossible worlds proposition expressed by
the later. Since this is precisely what is supposed to enable the inference from (10b) to
(10c), impossible worlds propositions offer some way out of the Frege-Soames puzzle.
Impossible worlds propositions do offer a way to deal with the puzzles regarding
belief ascriptions, but the logical structure of impossible worlds has so far been un-
derspecified. The reason they are useful for circumventing the present problems for
the semantics of propositional attitude ascriptions owes to the fact that their logical
structure is so underspecified. In order to make this clearer, consider the following
specification of the logical structure of worlds (still using f as a function mapping
worlds to sets of sentences).
(1) For any set of sentences Γ, there is a world w such that f(w) = Γ.
In less formal terms, for any set of sentences we could come up with, there is a world
that supports the truth of all and only those sentences.2 This way of specifying
the truth-supporting behavior of worlds makes them maximally fine-grained. More-
over, since the truth-supporting behavior of worlds is so fine-grained, the impossible
worlds propositions expressed by sentences are correspondingly fine-grained. Call
them maximally fine-grained impossible worlds propositions, and call their members
maximally fine-grained worlds. These propositions fail to reflect logical relations be-
tween sentences in the sense that implication relations do not manifest as the subset
relation—otherwise this maximally fine-grained account of propositions would not be
able to address the problems of logical omniscience. With this precise characteriza-
tion of the truth-supporting behavior of worlds, we can at least evaluate the resulting
extreme version of impossible worlds propositions.
2For a defense of this view of worlds, see Priest (2005).
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Let φ and ψ be sentences. The impossible worlds propositions expressed by φ and
ψ cannot, on the maximally fine-grained account, stand in a subset relation with one
another. In general, there are no two sentences that, on the maximally fine-grained
account, express the same impossible worlds proposition. If that is the case, at least
one desideratum of a theory of propositions is not met—there are no distinct sen-
tences expressing the same content, contra our intuitive judgments about sameness
of meaning. Given any impossible worlds proposition, we can locate the unique sen-
tence expressing that proposition because it will contain one world, the f value of
which is a singleton. In this sense, the maximally fine-grained impossible worlds the-
ory is much like a sententialist theory, according to which sentences simple express
themselves. Why? According to both accounts, every sentence expresses its own
unique content. The set-theoretic structure of impossible worlds propositions does
no obvious work over and above the sentences themselves. Of course, if one’s aim is
to represent sententialism as an extension of the familiar possible worlds framework,
then the collapse into sententialism is not itself a compelling critique.
However, sententialism faces some independently devastating challenges. First,
even though we have been presupposing that there is a single object language under
discussion, it is necessary to have an account of content according to which transla-
tion between languages is a matter of preserving content between languages. On the
maximally fine-grained account, there is no sense to be made of the fact that the same
content is expressible across distinct languages. And if so, ‘Snow is white’ expresses
a content distinct from that of ‘Schnie ist weiss.’ A sententialist cannot appeal to a
sameness-of-content relation in order to match up sentences across languages. It is
constitutive of sententialism that distinct sentences express distinct contents, because
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they express themselves.
Second, sententialism has trouble accounting for the fact that non-linguistic an-
imals seem capable of holding propositional attitudes. It is implausible to suggest
that ascribing, say, a desire to an animal is to assert that a relation holds between an
animal and a sentence.3 Perhaps, then, the animal stands in a relation to a sentence
of its own mental language. If so, it seems there are two possibilities: either agents
capable of holding propositional attitudes are so in virtue of standing in attitudinal
relations to a sentences of single mental language, or there are distinct mental lan-
guages across agents. But both of these options represent a departure from the sort
of sententialism resembling maximally fine-grained impossible worlds propositions.
Alternatively, it might seem that the defender of maximally fine-grained impossi-
ble worlds propositions is in a perfect position to account for translation as content
preservation. The proposal would be to pair up sentences according to sameness of
content, and to let f map worlds to sentences is such a way that no sentence occurs
in the f image of a world without its counterparts across distinct languages. For
instance, for any world w, f(w) would contain ‘Snow is white’ just in case it also
contains ‘Schnee ist weiss.’ Accordingly, it is possible for distinct sentences to ex-
press the same semantic content. But if this constitutes an acceptable solution to
the problem of translation across languages, why not suggest a similar move in order
to coarsen up impossible worlds such that for any world w, f(w) contains a sentence
φ if an only if f(w) contains any sentence that expresses the same content of φ?
3See Davidson (1982) for an argument that animals cannot genuinely hold propositional attitudes at
all. Quine, on the other hand, provides the following reason for thinking that animals can stand in
attitudinal relations to sentences: “We may treat a mouse’s fear of a cat as his fearing true a certain
English sentence. This is unnatural without being therefore wrong. It is a little like describing a
prehistoric ocean current as clockwise” (Quine (1956, 186)).
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Maximally fine-grained propositions would cease to be maximally fine-grained—and
this is for the better, since maximally fine-grained propositions have counterintuitive
consequences regarding the sameness of meaning relation and, therefore, relational
accounts of propositional attitude ascriptions.
This way of coarsening up maximally fine-grained propositions is problematic, but
perhaps not for an obvious reason. It may seem that any appeal to sameness of con-
tent in individuating the contents of sentences is viciously circular. In this case, the
defender of impossible worlds propositions would be appealing to sameness of content
in order to impose certain constraints on the function f mapping worlds to sets of
sentences. But even if the circularity is not vicious, the question of the conditions
under which distinct sentences express the same content is still left open. By reject-
ing (1), the defender of impossible worlds propositions is committed to specifying
the logical structure of worlds such that it is not completely trivial as it is in (1).
At the opposite end of the spectrum from maximally fine-grained propositions are
the coarse-grained possible worlds propositions discussed in the previous chapter. It
seems that it should be possible to find some appropriate middle ground between the
extremely coarse and the extremely fine in a way that does not rest on an appeal to
sameness of content.
One possibility for finding this middle ground is to let some consequence relation
govern the logical structure of impossible worlds. Such a relation would, of course,
have to be weaker than the classical consequence relation. The problem with this
proposal is that any such logical consequence relation would also govern the govern
the beliefs of ordinary epistemic agents in the following sense: If |=w were the con-
sequence relation governing worlds, then, given that belief is a relation to between
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agents and propositions that distributes over conjunction, belief must be closed under
the |=w relation. The reasons for thinking that this is an unacceptable result were
explored in section 3.1 of the previous chapter.
Another possibility would be to let the logical structure of worlds depend on a
more basic notion of epistemic possibility—a world is epistemically possible for an
agent A just in case it is compatible with the agent’s beliefs.4 For example, before
one learns that, say, the gravitational constant on Earth is 9.8 meters per second per
second, a world in which the gravitational constant on Earth is 7.5 meters per second
per second would be epistemically possible. For the purposes of talking about the
logical structure of worlds, the relevant notion of epistemic possibility is not relative
to any particular agent. We will say that w is epistemically possible if it is possible
that for some agent A, w is epistemically possible for A. This approach is advanta-
geous for defenders of impossible worlds propositions. First, it is compatible with fact
that distinct sentences can express the same proposition. For example, since there
are presumably no epistemically possible worlds in which ‘Bill likes Sue’ is true but
‘Sue is liked by Bill’ is false, these two sentences express the same impossible worlds
proposition. Second, the logical structure of worlds is not specified directly in terms
of sameness of content; rather, it is specified in terms of an independent notion of
epistemic possibility.
The central objection to this approach is that it renders relational accounts of
propositional attitude ascriptions more or less predictively impotent. If one were to
inquire into the closure properties of belief predicates, for example, the answer would
4There is a straightforward sense in which the totality of an Agent’s epistemically possible worlds
represents the knowledge state of an agent: since each world is compatible with everything the
agent knows, the totality of all such worlds encodes the totality of the agent’s knowledge—see
Hintikka (1962).
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be given in terms of epistemically possible worlds—the definition of which simply pre-
supposes that the closure properties for belief predicates are given. Since there is no
procedure for determining substantive answers to questions about closure properties
of belief, this approach to impossible worlds propositions is theoretically unmotivated.
Coarse-grained possible worlds possible worlds propositions at least come with a pro-
cedure for determining which belief ascriptions for from others, even if its predictions
are wrong.
To summarize, impossible worlds models of propositional content either predict
extremely fine-grained propositions, or else they simply leave open key questions
about the granularity of propositions. Maximally fine-grained impossible worlds—
worlds whose logical structure is trivial—underly a theory of content that effectively
collapses into a kind of sententialism about propositional content. While impossible
worlds models of propositions built on a notion of epistemic possibility presuppose,
rather than predict, closure properties of propositional attitude predicates.
The following question arises: is it possible to construct the set of epistemic possi-
bilities in a way that does not make epistemic possibility an unanalyzed theoretically
primitive notion? Why would it not be possible to strike a middle ground between
coarsely individuated metaphysical possibilities vs maximally fine-grained worlds? It
seems prima facie possible to model epistemic possibility to varying degrees of ideal-
ization. On the most radically ideal end of the spectrum are logically possible worlds,
and on the other end of the spectrum are the maximally fine-grained worlds. The
task, then, is to specify a plausible construction of epistemically possible worlds with-
out any ineliminable appeal to epistemic notions.
How would such a construction proceed? At the very least, epistemically pos-
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sible worlds should be such that the “obvious” logical truths are always supported.
For example, sentences such as ¬(P ∧ ¬P ) and P ↔ ¬¬P should always be true
in epistemically possible worlds. Why? These are the sorts of sentences expressing
propositions that it is expected of moderately rational agents to believe simply in
virtue of being rational epistemic agents (even if they refuse to accept the sentences
themselves). Also, epistemically possible worlds should be such that the “blatant”
logical falsehoods are never supported. For example, sentences such as P ∧ ¬P and
P ↔ ¬P should never be true in epistemically possible worlds. These are the sorts of
sentences expressing propositions that it is expected of moderately rational agents to
rule out in virtue of being rational epistemic agents. Unfortunately for the defender of
impossible worlds propositions, there is no middle ground between the coarse-grained
and the fine-grained that can accommodate these sorts of constraints—as shown in
Bjerring (2013) and Bjerring and Schwarz (2014). Here is the argument in condensed
form:
Assume worlds—whether possible or impossible—are [negation complete]
in the sense that for every sentence they verify either it or its negation.
Consider a world w that verifies some complex contradiction C of, say,
classical propositional logic. Since C is a contradiction, there is a proof
of ¬C. That is, there is a sequence of sentences S1, ..., Sn, ending in
Sn = ¬C, each member of which is either a simple tautology or derivable
from one or two earlier elements in the sequence by a simple logical rule
like modus ponens. Given that worlds are [negation complete], w contains
either Si or ¬Si for each element in the sequence S1, ..., Sn. So there are
exactly three possibilities for w: either (i) w verifies the negation of the
simple tautology, or (ii) w verifies the premises of a simple logical rule
as well as the negated conclusion, or (iii) w verifies both C and ¬C. In
each case, w is a trivially inconsistent world by the standards of classical
propositional logic. (Bjerring and Schwarz (2014, 6))
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In somewhat simpler terms, if a world supports the truth of an impossibility C, then
it supports the truth of very obvious and trivial impossibilities of the sort that should
not be considered epistemically possible for minimally rational agents.5 This is a
disappointing result for the prospects of grounding a theory of content on the notion
of epistemic possibility. It turns out that there is no way to define impossible worlds
such that only classically contradictory sentences supported are the “non-obvious”
contradictions.
The authors point out that the argument makes ineliminable use of the assump-
tion that impossible worlds are negation complete—for any world w and sentence P ,
w supports P or w supports ¬P . So, it is tempting to think that in order to circum-
vent this result we should simply posit that among the impossible worlds there are
negation incomplete worlds. But this seems to make the notion of epistemic possibil-
ity contingent on whether or not an epistemic agent as such must recognize bivalence.
Again, here is the reasoning in Bjerring and Schwarz (2014, 6):
[F]ailure of logical omniscience can hardly be reduced to skepticism about
bivalence. Consider an agent who is certain that either Si or ¬Si is true,
for all members of the sequence S1, ..., Sn. Worlds that verify neither
Si nor ¬Si should then not count as live possibilities for her: they are
not maximally specific ways things might be. But even in that context,
the complex contradiction C may be deemed possible by the agent, and
its negation ¬C may provide her with non-trivial information. This time,
the worlds she rules out cannot be partial worlds, since those were already
ruled out from the start. We are left with the original problem.
5This can be strengthened even further. Instead of invoking the idea of a “minimally rational”
agent, we could just appeal to what is and is not possible to believe full stop. In that sense, an
epistemically impossible world would be a world that supports the truth of sentences the contents
of which are impossible to believe, by rational agents or any other epistemic agent.
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This is a serious limitative result about the utility of impossible worlds for modeling
information, knowledge, and belief. Worlds-based models of information, according to
which an agents’ gaining information amounts to eliminating epistemic possibilities,6
are useful for modeling intentional notions like belief insofar as they can be specified
in extensional, set-theoretic terms. So, the impossibility of carving out epistemic
possibilities from the space of maximally fine-grained impossible worlds severely limits
the use of impossible worlds for modeling information.
2.2 Structuralism
Proponents of structured propositions hold that propositions are non-linguistic enti-
ties with constituents that are structured in some way—usually in a way that reflects
the syntactic trees of the sentences expressing those propositions. One motivation
for the analysis of propositions as structured entities is the flexibility provided by
syntactic structure for individuating propositions. Even if two different sentences are
true under the same conditions, the propositions expressed by those sentences could
be different as a result of their reflecting the different syntactic structures of those
sentences.
According to a version of structured propositionalism whose current defenders
include Soames, Salmon, and King—rooted primarily in Russell (1903)—the sen-
tence ‘John loves Sue’ expresses the proposition represented by a triple containing
the “Loves” relation and the individuals 〈John〉 and 〈Sue〉: 〈Loves, 〈John〉, 〈Sue〉〉.7
6See Dretske (2008) for a defense of the view that gaining information amounts to the elimination
of possibilities.
7See, for example, Salmon (1986), Soames (1987), and King (2007) for contemporary defenses of
russellian structured propositions.
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Logical combinations of sentences are composed recursively. For illustration, ‘John
does not love Sue’ expresses the proposition 〈NEG 〈Loves, 〈John〉, 〈Sue〉〉〉, and ‘John
loves Sue or Bill sleeps’ expresses the proposition 〈DISJ 〈Loves 〈John〉,〈Sue〉〉, 〈〈Bill〉
Sleep〉〉, and so on.8 A variant of the neo-Russellian approach is a view, developed
and defended independently by Cresswell and Lewis, according to which propositions
are structured intensions.9 The proposition (structured intention) expressed by the
sentence ‘John loves Sue’ is a tuple of intensions (functions from possible worlds to
extensions). For example, the intension ILoves of the expression ‘Loves’ is a function
from possible worlds to pairs of individuals, the first member of which loves the sec-
ond.
The technical difference between neo-Russellian approaches and Cresswell/Lewis
approaches is important because individuation of propositions on both approaches de-
pends on individuation of the constituents of propositions. While the constituents of
the former are objects and properties, the constituents of the latter are functions from
possible worlds to extensions. Under certain assumptions, it is possible for the two
approaches to make different predictions concerning the granularity of propositions.
For example, according to neo-Russellians, the sentence ‘A is is trilateral’ expresses
the structured proposition represented by 〈Trilateral,〈A〉〉 where ‘Trilateral’ stands
for the property of being trilateral, and ‘A’ stands for the object A. What about the
structured proposition expressed by the sentence ‘A is triangular’? Is it the same
proposition as that expressed by ‘A is trilateral’? One reason to think that they
express distinct propositions is that it seems possible to be unaware that, necessarily,
if something is triangular, then it is trilateral (and vice versa)—so the two sentences
8Here, ‘NEG’ and ‘DISJ’ denote the usual truth functions for negation and conjunction, respectively.
9Lewis (1972); Cresswell (1985)
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do not seem to be interchangeable in the complements of belief ascriptions. Notice
that the neo-Russellian is in a position to hold that the two sentences express distinct
propositions. As long as ‘Triangular’ and ‘Trilateral’ stand for distinct properties,
replacing one for the other as the constituent of a structured proposition results in a
distinct structured proposition. On the other hand, defenders of structured intensions
can recognize no distinction between what is expressed by ‘A is triangular’ vs ‘A is
trilateral.’
The concern is that the choice between the two options is not predicted by more
fundamental commitments about the individuation of properties. The neo-Russellian
is able to posit ad hoc distinctions between the semantic contents of primitive predi-
cates on an as-needed basis. The fact that primitive properties are the constituents of
neo-Russellian propositions is an both an advantage and a liability. It is advantageous
insofar as the neo-Russellian has a winning strategy for drawing distinctions between
intuitively distinct propositions. But this comes at the cost of having a theory that
rests on unanalyzed properties, which seem to be at least as mysterious as proposi-
tions were in the first place. Advocates of structured intensions, on the other hand,
seem to be stuck with the coarsely-individuated propositions, at least at the atomic
level.
Advocates of structured propositions also sacrifice a few key advantages of possible
worlds propositions. For example, since possible worlds propositions do not encode
any facts about the syntactic structure of sentences expressing them, they uphold
a clear distinction between form and content. In particular, defenders of possible
worlds propositions are able to maintain a clear distinction between linguistic form
and content. Of course, for a structured propositionalist, this would not be a com-
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pelling objection. After all, linguistic form, for structured propositionalists, simply
is an aspect of linguistic content. But this raises a question about the extent to
which linguistic form should determine distinctions between linguistic content. In the
previous section, the fact that translation between natural languages is supposed to
preserve content was used to undermine impossible worlds models of propositions.
But this objection reemerges for structured propositions, although in a different way.
If linguistic form is an aspect of linguistic content, then to what extent do different
syntactic patterns across languages prevent translations that faithfully preserve con-
tent?
The worry is not that advocates of structured propositions must posit a distinction
for every conceivable syntactic distinction; they are free to discard some syntactic dis-
tinctions as being semantically irrelevant. Rather, the concern is that there seems to
be no non-circular way of preferring some syntactic distinctions over others such that
some are semantically relevant while others are not. What is it in virtue of which
some syntactic distinctions play a role in distinguishing contents, while other syn-
tactic distinctions play no such role? An advocate of structured propositions seems
to be in no position to answer this question. Moreover, recognizing some syntactic
distinctions to be semantically relevant while holding others to be semantically irrel-
evant cannot simply be done on an as-needed basis. The same sort of question would
arise—what is it in virtue of which certain syntactic distinctions and not others are
semantically significant?
Another version of this objection applies independently of concerns about trans-
lation between languages. Consider, for example, the following pair of sentences:
(2) a. Grass is green and the Earth is round.
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b. The Earth is round and grass is green.
Intuitively, (2a) and (2b) express the same propositional content, at least in ordi-
nary contexts. So a structured propositionalist would have to say that the syntactic
distinction between (2a) and (2b) is semantically insignificant—linguistic form does
not contaminate linguistic content to the point of (2a) and (2b) being semantically
distinct in ordinary contexts. But, if the justification for holding that (2a) and (2b)
express the same content is that commuting conjunctions preserves content, this jus-
tification is not available to defenders of structured propositions.
Another advantage that unstructured possible worlds propositions have over struc-
tured propositions lies in the fact that there is a straightforward story to tell about
how possible worlds propositions have truth-conditions. The members of possible
worlds propositions just are the conditions relative to which (contextually-disambiguated)
sentences can be evaluated to truth and falsity. That being the case, sets of possible
worlds supporting the truth of a sentence φ encode precisely the truth conditions of
φ. There is therefore no apparent mystery about how possible worlds propositions
could be representational entities—they are representational insofar as they impose
conditions on how the world must be. Contrast this with the structuralist’s position.
If a proposition is a structured complex consisting of objects, properties, and rela-
tions, what is it in virtue of which such propositions represent things? In particular,
what is it in virtue of which such propositions have the truth conditions they have?
Another version of this question arises from the structuralist’s attempt to account
for the unity of structured propositions? Why, for example, does the sentence ‘Bill
walks’ express the proposition represented as (3)
(3) 〈BILL,〈WALK〉〉
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rather than expressing the following structured complex?
(4) 〈〈WALKS〉,BILL〉
The fact that there seems to be no obvious way to decide between the two representa-
tions is problematic because, at least mathematically, (3) and (4) are distinct objects.
If propositions are literally identified with ordered tuples, the choice between (3) and
(4) makes a difference.
The point here is not to establish conclusively that these questions are impossible
to answer. Rather, it is to show that in order to answer these questions some further
theoretical machinery seems necessary. By contrast, possible worlds propositions do
not raise the same sorts of questions. Notice, however, that a version of this challenge
does apply to maximally fine-grained impossible worlds propositions. Recall from the
previous section that maximally fine-grained impossible worlds propositions end up
being as fine-grained as sentences themselves. How, then, do they come to be repre-
sentational? One suggestion might be that they encode truth conditions in the same
way as possible worlds propositions, but they also enable fine-grained distinctions be-
tween truth-conditionally equivalent contents. The trouble, then, is that these further
distinctions seem to have nothing to do with their capacity to represent. Consider
again, for example, (2a) and (2b). The advocate of maximally fine-grained impossible
worlds propositions would either have to claim that these sentences express distinct
representations, or that they do not. At least in ordinary contexts, the former option
is completely implausible. But, on the other hand, if (2a) and (2b) do not express
propositions that are representationally distinct, what justification could one possibly
have for positing a distinction between the contents expressed by (2a) and (2b)?
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2.3 Inadequacies
Both of these options for circumventing the problems of logical omniscience and the
Frege-Soames puzzle come with their own respective challenges. Of course, impos-
sible worlds propositions and structured propositions are also by no means the only
alternatives to possible worlds propositions. Nevertheless, they are two of the most
popular views in the contemporary literature and they serve to illustrate some of the
distinct advantages offered by possible worlds propositions. We will close this short
chapter by making some general methodological observations that further suggest
steering clear of impossible worlds and structured propositions altogether.
To what extent should a model of propositional content generate predictions con-
cerning entailments between belief ascriptions? There are at least three possible
positions one might take here. The first is to say that propositional contents are sim-
ply not in the business of generating entailment patterns between belief ascriptions.
Whether, say, belief is closed under believed entailment is not a matter that should
be determined by the contents of belief ascriptions. To think otherwise is to conflate
questions about the norms of rationality with questions about content. If this is cor-
rect, then unless formal semantics is a part of normative epistemology, formal models
of propositional content seem to be unnecessary for strictly semantic purposes—we
should instead opt for a kind of primitivism about propositions.10
The second answer one might give is that a semantic theory of belief ascriptions
10Jeff King criticizes this sort of primitivism about propositions because of a worry about how
primitive propositions could come to have truth conditions: “I think that propositions do have
constituents. This is mainly because I find the idea of “simple fine grained propositions”, fine
grained propositions without constituents or parts, mysterious. What would make such a simple
proposition be about, say, Paris as opposed to Santa Monica? In virtue of what would it have the
truth conditions it in fact enjoys? I cannot see that these questions have answers if propositions
are held to be simple and fine grained” (King (2007, 6))
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is uninteresting unless it does generate predictions about the doxastic behavior of
rational agents. In fact, this is precisely what is unattractive about both maximally
fine-grained impossible worlds propositions as well as primitivism about propositions.
How do structured propositions look from this standpoint? It depends on the style
of structuralism in question. Clearly neo-Russellian structuralism fails as a frame-
work for generating predictions about rational belief. Structured propositions whose
constituents are unanalyzed properties, relations, and objects do not stand in the
right sorts of relations to one another so as to generate predictions about, say, ratio-
nal inference and belief revision. Any entailment patterns between belief ascriptions
that arise out of a neo-Russellian model of structured propositions will depend on
the individuation of properties and relations, which a neo-Russellian theory as such
does not account for in more basic terms. By contrast, consider the predictions gen-
erated by Lewis-Cresswell style structured intensions. Whenever P(x) and Q(x) are
co-intensional predicates, replacing one for the other in any extensional context would
be content-preserving because the resulting structured intension would be identical.
In this respect, not surprisingly, structured intensions are similar to regular intensions.
The question is whether the interchangeability of sentences like ‘A is triangular’ and
‘A is trilateral’ in the complements of belief ascriptions should count as a true pre-
diction about rational belief.
The third answer one might give is that, yes, models of propositional content
should be in the business of generating predictions about entailment patterns between
belief ascriptions, but such entailment patterns are merely artifacts of a relational the-
ory of belief together with a correct individuation of contents. This is the view to
be defended in the chapter 3. The aim is to construct propositional contents that
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share in the benefits and motivations of the possible worlds theory—i.e. unstruc-
tured, non-primitive objects that encode truth conditions of sentences, which are
related to each other in a way that generates entailment patterns for propositional
attitude ascriptions—and corrects for the problems—i.e. overly coarse granularity,
which leads to the problems of logical omniscience and the Frege-Soames puzzles.
2.4 Informal Individuation Criterion
Up to this point, most of the discussion of propositional content has focused on the
individuation of contents across sentences. In the previous chapter this was shown to
underlie a class of related problems facing possible worlds propositions. It should be
clear from the present chapter that individuation also presents problems for the famil-
iar alternatives to possible worlds propositions. What has not been established is that
the individuation of propositions is a problem in itself independent of any particular
formal construction. This position was most clearly defended in Quine (1986, ch 1)
in which competing formal constructions of propositions were shown to fail to parti-
tion natural language sentences properly. But, instead of following Quine’s inductive
hypothesis that no proper individuation is forthcoming and, therefore, showing how
we might do without propositions (and sameness of meaning) altogether, the goal in
what follows is to construct propositions in a way that avoids the objections so far
raised.
If a proposition can be expressed by distinct sentences at all, then, independent
of any particular formal construction of propositions, we should expect syntactic cri-
teria to decide questions regarding sameness of meaning. One subconclusion of the
previous chapter was that the problems of logical omniscience, the problems related
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to the closure of propositional attitude predicates under logical consequence, are only
really problematic in a subclass of cases. In particular, using the language of classical
first-order logic as a toy model, the proposal was that if distinct logically equivalent
sentences embed the same atomic sentences, we should be happy to say that they
express the same proposition—the thought being that syntactic recombinations of
the same atomic constituents using sound logical rules is not enough to induce a
change in content. This criterion, proposed in the previous chapter as a necessary
and sufficient condition for determining sameness of content, is inconsistent with the
predictions of the various formal constructions sketched so far. But, as it stands, it
is only a success condition for a formal construction of propositional contents; what
is lacking is a formal construction of propositions predicting precisely this criterion
of individuation, which is the aim of the following chapter.
Chapter 3
A NEW MODEL OF
PROPOSITIONS
3.0
The previous chapters laid out a family of related problems facing unstructured propo-
sitions. These problems seem clearly to outweigh the benefits associated with the
philosophical motivations for unstructured propositional contents. The aim of the
present chapter is to present a revised account of propositional content that avoids
these problems and which does not resort to imposing any syntactic structure on
propositions. We start by providing some intuitive motivation for the revised ac-
count.
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3.1 Tracking Theories and Modular Machines
Recall from the first chapter that tracking solutions to the problem of intentionality—
the problem of giving a naturalistic account of intentional mental states—yield an un-
acceptably coarse individuation of propositions. Here is a quick summary: According
to tracking accounts, the states of a system that, under ideal conditions, track states
of the environment are bearers of information about the environment. For example,
under the right conditions, the finitely-many states of a digital thermometer can bear
information about the environment’s temperature because the thermometer tracks
the environment’s temperature. That is, a digital thermometer is capable of being in
states (O1, O2, ..., On) that reflect, or indicate, corresponding environmental tempera-
ture states (E1, E2, ..., En) through causal co-variation.
1 This picture leads to a coarse
individuation of content precisely because the relation of indication between Oi’s and
Ei’s is a non-hyperintensional relation—if a state Oi indicates Ei, and, necessarily,
Ei obtains if and only if Ej obtains, then Oi must also indicate Ej. So, if intentional
states like belief are special cases of indicating states, then representational states do
not make hyperintensional distinctions. A central reason, perhaps the central reason,
for positing distinctions between necessarily equivalent contents vanishes.
There is nothing particularly controversial about this account of how the states
of a physical system can be said to indicate possible states of the environment and,
thereby, can be said to bear information about the environment. What is controver-
sial is the claim such states are genuinely intentional and that the things indicated
by such states are propositional contents.2 But this further step will not be relevant
1For various tracking accounts of intentionality, see Dretske (1981), Stalnaker (1984), Stalnaker
(1986), and Fodor (1990).
2Apart from the fact that this account of intentional mental states yields an unacceptably coarse
individuation of contents, proponents of “phenomenal” accounts of representation (see, for exam-
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here; what will be relevant is the innocent causal tracking relation itself. The tracking
relation between possible states of a system and possible states of the environment
provides the basis for constructing propositional contents, although not in the way
envisaged by some proponents of the tracking account of intentionality. The question
of how to construct propositions from the causal tracking relation turns on the ques-
tion of how to individuate the possible states of a complex system with component
modules that track various distinct aspects of the environment.
Consider a system that tracks exactly one aspect of the environment by being in
one of two possible states S1 and S2. As far as the system is concerned there are
two possible states of the environment—E1 and E2. This can be true even if the
aspect of the environment being tracked is not really binary—the system just keeps
track of the environment in a coarse-grained way. To say that the system tracks the
relevant environmental states is to say that, for i = 1 or i = 2, the system is in Si if
and only if the environment is in Ei, where the “if and only if” is causal. Of course,
there can be another system whose role it is to track exactly one other aspect of
the environment—it is capable of being in one of two states S ′1 and S
′
2 which reflect
environmental states E ′1 and E
′
2, respectively. In general, for any possible aspect of
the environment, we can imagine a possible system whose role it is to keep track of
that aspect. Suppose now that each of these systems are component modules of one
unified representational system. The unified system has different components whose
role it is to keep track of distinct aspects of the environment. If the system has n
component modules, then as far as the system is concerned at its full tracking ca-
pacity, there are 2n possible states that the environment can be in. In other words,
ple, Mendelovici (2013) and Kriegel (2013)) argue that tracking accounts are incomplete because
intentionality includes an irreducibly phenomenal component.
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when all component modules are active, the system is capable of indicating that the
environment is in one of 2n distinct states. This is not to say that there are only 2n
distinct possible states that the environment can really be in. There will be more than
n distinct aspects that contribute to composing possible environmental states. Also,
the individual aspects that are tracked by components of the system might actually
have continuum-many possible values. The fact that the representational system’s
components do their representing in binary effectively discretizes the system’s range
of possible representations.
From the fact that in our imagined system there are only 2n possible configura-
tions of n binary components when all components are active (and the corollary that
the system is limited to representing 2n possible environmental states while operating
at full capacity), it does not follow that the system is only capable of being in a total
of 2n distinct states. One of the benefits of modular design is that subsystems are
capable of operating independently of one another. So, in case half of the component
modules composing the system fail, the system as a whole can still be operative.3.
But the fact that our imagined system has this modular structure means that the
number of possible states of the whole system has to be the sum of the distinct pos-
sible states that each subsystem can can be in. Whenever some number of modules
are inactive, the resulting subsystem gives rise to a fresh set of possible states.
This answers the question of how to individuate the possible states of a represen-
tational system. If we individuate states based on the presupposition that the system
is only doing its representing if all component modules are active, then we end up
with a lower number of possible states. But, recognizing the fact that representa-
3One consequence is that modular systems are “future proof” in the sense that new modules can be
imported to interact with existing systems
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tional systems can track distinct aspects of the environment with n modules that
operate independently of one another, the number of possible states that the system
can be in at any given time is far greater than 2n. This is a consequence of the fact
that fine-grained states of the system (states of the system when operating at full
capacity) are numerically distinct from the coarse-grained states of which the former
are special cases.
We can make things more concrete by considering a physical system that is com-
posed of four modules, each of which are binary indicators for four environmental
variables—temperature, pressure, moisture, and wind speed. It is a very coarse-
grained system in the sense that its components yield only 1 or 0, depending on
the environment: the component module for tracking temperature (a binary ther-
mometer) reads 1 or 0 depending on whether the environment is hot or cold, the
component module for tracking pressure (a binary barometer) reads 1 or 0 depending
on whether atmospheric pressure is high or low, and so on. In this simple four-
component representational system, calculating the number of its possible distinct
states is straightforward counting exercise, but it illustrates how our approach to in-
dividuating representational states generates large numbers of possible states from
simple systems: If the thermometer, barometer, hygrometer, and anemometer com-
ponents of the system are all active, then there are 24 = 16 possible states that the
system can be in. If only a subset of the components are active, there are more possi-
bilities to count. There are a total of
(
4
3
)
= four possible choices of three components,
where each of the four choices can take on 23 = eight distinct configurations. So the
total number of states compiled from all the three-component versions of our system
is 12. There are a total of
(
4
2
)
= six possible choices of two components where each
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of the six choices can take on 22 = four distinct configurations. So the total number
of states compiled from all the two-component versions of our system is 24. Finally,
there are
(
4
1
)
= four possible choices of one component where each of the four choices
can take on two distinct configurations for a total of eight possible states compiled
from all the single-component versions of our system. Summing everything up shows
that our simple system can be in one of 16 + 12 + 24 + 8 = 60 possible representa-
tional states. If we generalize this counting procedure, the number of distinct possible
states for a modular system with n distinct (binary) components is
∑n
k=1
(
n
k
)
2k.
But this is not an essay on design techniques for systems engineering. How does
this relate to the goal of constructing propositional contents? One way to proceed
would be to identify the possible states of the environment that are represented by a
system with n binary components with possible worlds. Propositions might then be
identified with functions from such worlds to truth-values. The finest-grained distinc-
tions that the system can make among possible worlds is determined by its number
of independent binary components. There is no need to consider the distinctions
that subsystems can draw among possibilities because special cases of coarse-grained
states are not numerically distinct from the states of which they are special cases. For
example, our four-component binary system can be in a state in which only three of
its four modules are active—indicating that it is hot, low-pressure, and windy. Alter-
natively, if the anemometer becomes inactive for one reason or another, the system
(because of its modular design) would indicate just that the environment is hot and
low-pressure. In this case, the system would be in a numerically distinct represen-
tational state without representing a numerically distinct environmental state—the
distinct state of the system just represents less information about the same envi-
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ronmental condition. A system with n binary components can distinguish at most
2n numerically distinct possible environmental states—that is, possible worlds. So,
a function from possible worlds—in this sense—to truth-values would be a function
over a fixed domain containing exactly 2n possible worlds. Of course, this is just the
usual coarse-grained characterization of propositions as sets of possible worlds, the
semantic consequences of which we set out to avoid.
The present proposal for constructing propositions from the tracking account of
representation is to reorient the focus to the states of a representational (i.e. track-
ing) system itself rather than the objective possibilities represented by the sys-
tem. This approach has the advantage of being able to leverage the fact that for
any representational system, there are always strictly more representational states
than there are states to be represented. In the following section this proposal will
be illustrated explicitly by applying it to a toy fragment of natural language, the
quantifier/variable/identity-free fragment of a first-order language with logically in-
dependent atomic sentences. Even though this language is trivially simple, it exhibits
the problematic semantic features of natural language that were highlighted in the
previous two chapters. In particular, if it is interpreted with a standard possible
worlds semantic model, then logically equivalent sentences express the same propo-
sition, there is only one necessarily true proposition; there is only one necessarily
false proposition; propositional operators (that distribute over conjunction) would be
closed under logical entailment; the Frege-Soames puzzle for worlds-based proposi-
tions applies.4
4This list is not meant to be exhaustive; these were the issues discussed in the previous two chapters.
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3.2 A Formal Model
Let L be a language whose alphabet consists of at most countably-many individual
constants and n-ary predicate symbols for each natural number n, the usual logical
connectives, and parentheses. The members of L are the atomic sentences Pa1...an
(where P an n-ary predicate symbol) and complex sentences: ¬φ, (φ ∧ ψ), (φ ∨ ψ),
and (φ → ψ), whenever φ and ψ are members of L. So, our toy language L is just
the propositional fragment of the language of FOL without identity.
The contents of sentences of L will be functions whose values are 1 and 0, indi-
viduated extensionally—that is, contents will be identified by the ordered pairs they
contain. The question is, what are the domains of propositions, and how are they
determined? The proposed answer is that for a given sentence φ of L, the domain
of the proposition expressed by φ is a partition of logical space into discrete cells,
where the cardinality of the partition is determined by the number of atomic sen-
tences occurring at least once in φ. Start with a single atomic sentence p1 in L. The
proposition expressed by p1 is the function mapping two points to {0, 1}, where the
points represent the partition of logical space into two possibilities—the possibility
that p1 and the possibility that ¬p. The domain of the proposition expressed by p1
is represented as the set of vertices of an instance of the binary hypercube graph Q1:
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Figure 1
The top and bottom nodes represent the set of possible worlds supporting the falsity
and truth of p1, respectively. Given this domain, the content expressed by the atomic
sentence p1 is simply the function mapping the top node to 0 and the bottom node to
1. Suppose that the sentence φ is a truth-functional combination of atomic sentences
p1 and p2, and nothing more. Then the domain of φ is the partition of logical space
into four cells that represent the four possible combinations of truth-values of p1 and
p2. We represent the domain of φ as the set of vertices of the Q2 graph:
Figure 2
The content of φ is the function mapping the set of vertices of (the appropriate
instance of) Q2 into {0, 1}. It should be clear from the graph diagrams that the
domains of p1 and p2 are simply projections of the domain of φ onto the first and
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second dimension of Q2, respectively.
5
Let ψ be a truth-functional combination of atomic sentences p1, p2, and p3, and
nothing more. Then the domain of ψ is a set of vertices of the binary hypercube Q3:
Figure 3
And if γ is a truth-functional combination of p1—p4, and nothing more, its domain
is the set of vertices of an instance of Q4—the tesseract:
5That is how it is possible to maintain that the domains (and, therefore, the contents) of p1 and
p2 are distinct, even though they are both identified with an instance of Q1. Outside of a higher-
dimensional context, they would both be represented as the set of Q1’s vertices. But of course
neither has a claim to being the privileged domain that is identifiable with the unique set of
vertices of Q1—the domains of p1 and p2 are both sets that are the sets of vertices of distinct
instances of Q1.
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Figure 4
In general, for any k, the content of an L-sentence containing at least one occurrence
of exactly k distinct atomic sentences is a function whose domain is represented as
a particular n-dimensional projection of some higher-dimensional space. If L has n
atomic sentences, the total number of such functions is
∑n
k=1
(
n
k
)
2k.
A note of caution: Although it can be a useful heuristic to think in terms of
an analogy with ordinary truth tables, according to which the nodes of the graph
Qn correspond to the rows of a truth table with n propositional variables, the sub-
tle disanalogy with truth table representations is also important. The nodes of the
Qi’s represent points relative to which fixed atomic propositions and logical combi-
nations thereof are assigned semantic values 1 or 0. Truth tables, on the other hand,
do not depend on any choice of particular collections of atomic formulas. Rather,
the “formulas” in the leftmost columns of the top row of a truth table are proposi-
tional metavariables. A particular domain with cardinality n of a proposition in the
present sense is one of
(
m
n
)
possibilities projected from Qm. Contrast this with the
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fact that there is only one truth table with n rows (ignoring differences in the columns
with logically complex “formulas” and possible differences in naming conventions for
metavariables).
Here is how the familiar recursive assignment of possible world intensions to sen-
tences of L would go. The recursive definition of semantic types and domains is:6
(1) Semantic Types
a. e and t are semantic types.
b. If σ and τ are semantic types, then 〈σ, τ〉 is a semantic type.
c. If σ is a semantic type, then 〈s, σ〉 is a semantic type.
d. Nothing else is a semantic type.
(2) Semantic Domains
a. De = the set of all individuals.
b. Dt = {0, 1}, the set of truth-values.
c. If σ and τ are semantic types, then D〈σ,τ〉 is the set of all functions from
Dσ to Dτ .
d. Intensions: If σ is a type, then D〈s,σ〉 is the set of all functions from W to
Dσ.
An expression whose intension is in the domain D〈s,σ〉 is said to have an intension of
type 〈s, σ〉. In L, constants have intensions of type 〈s, e〉 (that is, constants denote
functions from possible worlds to individuals in De); unary predicates have intensions
of type 〈s, 〈e, t〉〉; binary predicates have intensions of type 〈s, 〈e, 〈e, t〉〉〉 sentences
6We are following the notation used in Von Fintel and Heim (2002). The reason for defining domains
and types for sub-sentential constituents is to allow for the addition of quantifiers to L in the
following section.
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have intensions of type 〈s, t〉. The intensions of sentences of L are determined by the
extensions of their parts relative to possible worlds:
(3) a. JPa1...anK¢ = λws. JP K¢(w)(Ja1K¢(w))...(JanK¢(w)) = 1.
b. For L-sentences φ and ψ:
i. J¬φK¢ = λws. JφK¢(w) = 0.
ii. Jφ ∧ ψK¢ = λws. min(JφK¢(w), JψK¢(w)).
iii. Jφ ∨ ψK¢ = λws. max(JφK¢(w), JψK¢(w)).7
Accordingly, the intensions of all sentences of L are functions defined over a fixed
domain of possible worlds W . We now revise this recursive definition of intensions in
light of the previous discussion so that they are functions from appropriate partitions
of W to truth-values.
We begin by adding to our stock of primitive semantic types. Suppose that each
of the atomic sentences of L are assigned a unique natural number. Then every
set of atomic sentences is associated with a subset of N. Certain subsets Γ of N
induce a partition of W according to the atomic sentences encoded by members of Γ.
Supposing that, say, Γ = {3, 19, 36}, the partition of W induced by Γ—denoted by
W/Γ—has eight cells corresponding to all of the truth functional combinations of the
three atomic sentences assigned respectively to 3, 19, and 36. So, one cell of W/Γ is
the set of all members of W in which all three sentences are true; another cell will
be the set of all members of W in which the first two are true and the third is false,
and so on. Let WL denote the set of all partitions of W induced by sets of natural
numbers encoding the atomic sentences of L. (Notice that if L contains n atomic
sentences, then the cardinality of WL is
∑n
k=1
(
n
k
)
= 2n − 1.) We have the following
7We let Jφ→ ψK¢ := J¬φ ∨ ψK¢ and Jφ↔ ψK¢ := J(φ→ ψ) ∧ (ψ → φ)K¢.
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expanded inventory of primitive types:
(4) Semantic Types*
a. e and t are semantic types.
b. If σ and τ are semantic types, then 〈σ, τ〉 is a semantic type.
c. If σ is a semantic type, then 〈s, σ〉 is a semantic type.
d. If Γ is a set of natural numbers encoding atomic sentences of L, then
〈sΓ, t〉 is a semantic type.
e. Nothing else is a semantic type.
The new semantic types, in turn, expand our inventory of semantic domains:
(5) Semantic Domains*
a. De = D, the set of all individuals.
b. Dt = {0, 1}, the set of truth-values.
c. If σ and τ are semantic types, then D〈σ,τ〉 is the set of all functions from
Dσ to Dτ .
d. Intensions: If σ is a type, then D〈s,σ〉 is the set of all functions from W to
Dσ.
e. Contents: If Γ is a set of natural numbers encoding atomic sentences of
L, D〈sΓ,t〉 is the set of all functions from W/Γ to {0, 1}.
It is already possible to see that contents, so-defined, are more fine-grained than
possible world intensions (functions of type 〈s, t〉). If L has n atomic sentences,
then the total number of contents that are expressible in the language would be
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∑n
k=1
(
n
k
)
2n—by contrast, there would only be 2n intensions expressible in L.8
(6) (Definition) If w is a member of W/Γ, and Γ′ ⊆ Γ, then projΓ′(w) is the
unique member w′ of W/Γ′ such that w ⊆ w′.
The projX() functions are functions that project cells in a “higher-dimensional” par-
tition of W onto cells in a partition determined by a subset of those dimensions. For
illustration, picturing the nodes of the hypercube graph Q3 as the eight cells of a par-
tition of W by three atomic formulae, the function projΓ() is one of the projections of
Q3 onto Q2 or Q1, the nodes of which represent cells of a lower-dimensional partition
of W . We now have the machinery necessary for a recursive assignment of contents
to L-sentences φ, which we will denote with JφK∗:
(7) a. For pi the i
th atomic sentence of L: JpiK∗ = λws{i} . ∀w′ ∈ w: JpiK¢(w′) =
1.
b. For L-sentences φ and ψ of type 〈sΦ, t〉 and 〈sΨ, t〉 respectively:
i. J¬φK∗ = λwsΦ . JφK∗(w) = 0.
ii. Jφ ∧ ψK∗ = λwsΦ∪Ψ . min(JφK∗(projΦ(w)), JψK∗(projΨ(w))).
iii. Jφ ∨ ψK∗ = λwsΦ∪Ψ . max(JφK∗(projΦ(w)), JψK∗(projΨ(w))).9
Just where a particular sentence’s content lives in the hierarchy of types is determined
by the types of its parts. This marks an important distinction of the present account.
Whereas according to theories identifying contents with possible world intensions, the
contents of sentences were all of the same type 〈s, t〉, a peculiarity of the resulting
contents assigned to sentences is that they are functions defined over shifty domains.
8This is analogous to the difference between the two different ways of individuating the possible
states of a machine with n distinct binary components.
9Similarly, we let Jφ→ ψK∗ := J¬φ ∨ ψK∗ and Jφ↔ ψK∗ := J(φ→ ψ) ∧ (ψ → φ)K∗
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A given L-sentence φ, according to the present account, can be seen to have three
distinct types: First, the extension of the φ is simply a truth value 0 or 1; second,
the intension of a sentence is that function of type 〈s, t〉 mapping W into {0, 1},
third, the content of φ is that function of type 〈sΓ, t〉 for some Γ ⊆ N, determined by
the φ’s parts, mapping W/Γ into {0, 1}. We conclude the current section with some
observations and clarification remarks on the construction in (7).
The analogy between contents with the states of the representational system de-
scribed in the previous section should be evident—both can be modeled as functions
mapping the nodes of binary hypercubes of in some finite dimension into truth values.
We noted that the states of the representational system can be individuated, in part,
by the particular set of modules that are active. So the nodes of a hypercube in n
dimensions represent the 2n possible configurations of each of its binary component
modules. Similarly, the contents of sentences can be individuated, in part, by the
set of atomic formulas occurring in them. The nodes of a hypercube in n dimensions
represent the 2n cells of the partition of logical space induced by the set of “active”
atomic formulas.
Does it follow that the characterization of content in (7) involves conflating form
with content?10 After all, the contents of sentences are being individuated, in part, by
the set of atomic formulas occurring in them. It looks as though some of the explicit
syntax of L is contaminating contents, something like the way in which syntactic
structure is mirrored by Russellian structured propositions. But this is incorrect. It
is clear in (7) that the ordinary intensions of atomic formulae determine the contents
of atomic formulae, which are defined to be functions defined on various partitions of
10Recall that this is one problem with structuralist accounts of propositions—cf. Chapter 2, sect. 2.
CHAPTER 3. A NEW MODEL OF PROPOSITIONS 64
W—the cells of which are comprised of ordinary possible world intensions (see (7a)).
There is nothing special about the atomic sentences themselves that plays a role in
the construction of contents. At bottom, it is the ordinary intensions of atomic for-
mulae that determine the relevant partitions of W featured in the recursive clauses of
(7). (Another way to appreciate the same point is to consider a language L′ that is
identical to L except that its atomic formulae are notationally different from those of
L. Let f be a one-to-one correspondence between the atomic formulae of L′ and those
of L such that for all p in Dom(f): JpK¢ = Jf(p)K¢. Notice that, from the contents
assigned to complex sentences of L′ by (7), we can determine the contents of complex
sentences in L as follows: for φ a complex sentence in L, JφK∗ = Jf−1(φ)K∗ where
f−1(φ) is that sentence of L′ formed by replacing all atomic sentences p occurring in
φ with f−1(p).)
3.3 Solutions to Problems
Propositional contents as defined in the previous section have a number of advantages
over possible worlds propositions. We start with the most pressing of the problems
discussed in the previous chapters.
3.3.1 Nonidentity of Logical Equivalents
According to the familiar relational accounts, a propositional attitude report is true
just in case the subject of the report stands in a particular binary relation to the
proposition expressed by the complement clause of the report. It follows that any
two clauses expressing the same proposition are interchangeable salva veritate in the
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complements of attitude reports. Perhaps the most damaging consequence of the
intension/content identification is the fact that, together with the relational account
of attitude reports, it predicts that logically equivalent clauses are identical and,
therefore, interchangeable salva veritate in the complements of attitude reports. The
previous chapter reviewed some of the ways for the defender of coarse propositions
to deal with this unattractive result (idealization, fragmentation, diagonalization, ap-
peals to pragmatics), none of which were ultimately very satisfying. The solution to
the problem of interchangeability calls for fine-grained propositions of some sort or
other.
To show that logically equivalent contents, as defined in (7) above, need not be
interchangeable in propositional attitude reports, it suffices to show that there are
logically equivalent propositions that are nevertheless not identical. Consider the
logically equivalent sentences pi and pi ∨ (pk ∧ ¬pk), where pi and pk are atomic
L-sentences assigned to i and k respectively. According to (7), the content of pi is
that function of type 〈s{i}, t〉 that maps partition cells of W to the value 1 just in
case every element of that cell is a member of the ordinary intension of pi. By con-
trast, the content assigned to pi ∨ (pk ∧ ¬pk) is that function of type 〈s{i,k}, t〉 that
maps partition cells w of W to 1 depending on the values of JpiK∗(proj{i}(w)) andJ(pk∧¬pk)K∗(proj{k}(w)). These contents are distinct because functions are individu-
ated extensionally by their members. That being the case, it is possible for an agent
to stand in a propositional attitude relation to one and not the other. This is how the
problem of interchangeability of necessary equivalents in attitude reports is resolved.
Even though the propositions are necessarily equivalent (they have the same possible
worlds intensions), they are defined on extensionally distinct domains.
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Information and Logical Necessity
The following two sentences are about different things:
(8) a. Either it will rain today, or it will not.
b. Either the stock market will crash today, or it will not.
The former is concerned with whether or not it will rain today and the latter is con-
cerned with whether or not the stock market will crash today. Accordingly, since
they concern different subjects, an agent might believe or assert (8a) without thereby
believing or asserting (8b).11 For example, a child having no concept of the stock mar-
ket might have logically true beliefs about today’s rain without having any beliefs
about the stock market, let alone logically true ones. But according to coarse-grained
accounts of propositional content, these intuitions about the distinction between con-
tents expressed by (8a) and (8b) must be disregarded or explained away—the content
of (8a) and (8b) is simply the necessary proposition, the constant function mapping
worlds to the value 1.
But since, according to (7), logically equivalent sentences need not express the
same contents, we are not automatically forced to say that all logically necessary
contents are the same. In particular, supposing that (8a) and (8b) are translated as
disjunctions of atomic L-sentences, their contents would be distinct from one another
because they are functions defined on distinct domains: (8a) maps the two partition
cells of W determined by ‘It will rain today’ to the value 1, while (8b) maps the two
partition cells of W determined by ‘The market will crash today’ to the value 1. So,
not only are there logically equivalent sentences that can express distinct contents,
11We are bracketing the possibility of idiosyncratic psychological tendencies.
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there are, in particular, pairs of logically true sentences that express distinct con-
tents. It follows that at epistemic agent might bear a cognitive attitude towards one
necessary truth without thereby bearing that attitude towards all necessary truths.
This shows that at least two versions of the logical omniscience problem plaguing
unstructured coarse-grained contents are overcome by our present characterization of
unstructured contents.
It might be objected that there is a sense in which (8a) and (8b) are about the
same thing and, therefore, express the same content—they are about everything since
they express logical truths and logical truths do not have a subject matter. Some-
one who knows only the meanings of truth-functional disjunction and negation would
know that (8a) and (8b) are both true, regardless of the contents of their constituents.
Logical truths like (8a) and (8b) are topic neutral; so any theory allocating distinct
contents to distinct logically true sentences must be incorrect.
While there is certainly some sense in which pairs of logical truths are not about
distinct things (i.e. the sense in which their truth conditions are neutral with respect
to the contents of their constituents), this is not the sense of aboutness relevant in
evaluating (7). There is, after all, a similar sense in which arithmetic truths are about
everything, at least everything that can be numbered, counted, measured, etc., but
it does not follow that arithmetic is not about the natural numbers. The problem
with this objection is the presupposition that understanding the conditions under
which a sentence is true is not only necessary but sufficient to grasp the content
expressed by a sentence. But anyone who accepted the latter—that understanding
truth conditions is sufficient for understanding content—would certainly be someone
already committed to a coarse-grained account of propositional content according to
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which all necessarily true sentences express the same content, and this is just one of
the consequences of coarse-grained contents that motivates a finer characterization of
propositional contents.
3.3.2 Logical Consequence
Recall that unstructured content forces certain propositional attitude predicates—
those that distribute over conjunction—to be closed under logical consequence. 12
But this paper has been a defense of a version of unstructured content; does this
argument show that (distributive) propositional attitude predicates must be closed
under logical consequence after all? No. According to (7) even if φ |= ψ, it does
not follow that JφK−1∗ [{1}] ⊆ JψK−1∗ [{1}] (that is, it does not follow that the set of
arguments to JφK∗ that get mapped to 1 is a subset of the set of arguments to JψK∗ that
get mapped to 1). So the premise of the previous argument identifying the content
of φ with the content of φ ∧ ψ is false under the present characterization of content.
So distributive propositional attitude predicates need not be closed under logical
consequence. Consequently, this argument aimed at theories of unstructured contents
does not override the foregoing observations: necessarily equivalent sentences—and,
in particular, sentences expressing logical truths—need not be interchangeable in the
complement clauses of propositional attitude reports.
12Here is the argument: Let φ and ψ be L-sentences such that the set of worlds supporting the
truth of φ is a subset of the set of worlds supporting the truth of ψ. Let P be a propositional
attitude predicate that distributes over conjunction and suppose that P (φ). Since the possible
worlds content of φ∧ψ is the intersection of that of φ and ψ, the possible worlds content of φ∧ψ
is just that of φ itself. It follows that P (φ ∧ ψ). Since P distributes over conjunction, it follows
that P (ψ), showing that P is closed under logical consequence.
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3.3.3 Revenge Cases?
Even though the problems that face coarse-grained unstructured intensions do not
apply in full generality to our present characterization of content, it is conceivable that
there are special instances of these problems that still apply. What we have shown
so far is that contents defined on appropriate partitions of the domain W allow for
fine-grained distinctions between logically equivalent contents. This is consistent,
however, with the existence of distinct L-sentences the contents of which are defined
over the same partition of W . This is to be expected—otherwise all syntactically
distinct sentences would express distinct contents. But, because of this, the threat of
conflating distinct contents could conceivably reemerge. If JφK∗ and JψK∗ are defined
over the same partition of W , all three of the following problems do reemerge: (i)
if φ and ψ are logically equivalent sentences, they are identical in content, and are,
therefore, interchangeable in the complements of propositional attitude reports; (ii)
if they’re both logically necessary sentences, they express the same contents; (iii)
the argument from logical consequence through as normal—whenever JφK−1∗ [{1}] ⊆JψK−1∗ [{1}], we get, according to (7bii), that the content of φ is identical to the content
of φ ∧ ψ—so propositional attitude predicates that distribute over conjunction are
closed under logical consequence (limited to sentences defined over a given partition
of W ).
It is not hard to see that, in fact, these are favorable predictions of our present
characterization of contents. To see why, consider an example of the prediction in (i),
in which the following sentences are predicted to express the same content:
(9) a. Grass is green and Snow is white.
b. Snow is white and grass is green.
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These sentences express the same content—merely reordering conjuncts does not in-
tuitively result in a change of content.13 In fact, it seems that any arbitrary logically
equivalent formulation of (9a) and (9b) that contains exactly the atomic sentences
‘Grass is green’ and ‘Snow is white’ (and no others) will amount to a rewording of
just the same content.
Is there any reason for holding that logically equivalent but syntactically distinct
rewordings of (9a) or (9b) could express a distinct content? First, if such a pair
could express distinct contents, it would not be in virtue of having distinct truth
conditions—we are only considering pairs of logically equivalent sentences. Second,
it is difficult to maintain that any pair of such sentences could be intuitively about
different things. If two sentences contain exactly the same atomic sentences as con-
stituents, and they are logically equivalent, then any distinction in their contents
must be traceable to their logical expressions. But (9a) and (9b) are about grass
and snow, not conjunction—and it seems that the same could be said for any other
logical permutation of them. Third, if it is possible for an agent to believe the content
expressed by (9a) (or (9b)) without thereby believing the content expressed by some
logically equivalent formulation containing just the atomic sentences occurring in (9a)
(and no more), then the relational account of belief dictates that different contents
are being expressed. But it is not much of a stretch to suggest that (9a) and (9b)
are themselves mutually interchangeable salva veritate in the complements of belief
ascriptions. Moreover, since it is implausible that introducing more logical complex-
ity to a sentence could play a role in altering content if no new atomic formulas are
introduced (and truth conditions are preserved), we can safely generalize the claim
13(9a) and (9b) are predicted to have identical contents only if the conjunctions are tenseless. That
is, e.g., (9a) does not mean that grass is green and then snow is white.
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about interchangeability within complement clauses of belief reports: if φ and ψ are
logically equivalent and are composed of the atomic formulas, any agent believes that
φ just in case it believes that ψ.
In fact, apart from whether or not our characterization of content predicts this
general interchangeability of logical equivalents relative to a particular partition of W ,
it can be independently established by induction on the complexity of L-sentences as
follows: Let S be any epistemic agent and suppose that the L-sentence A is composed
of the two atomic L-sentences pi and pk. The base case—S believes that A—is given.
Suppose that B is any logically equivalent formulation of A composed of only pi and
pk. By inductive hypothesis, S believes that B. Now suppose that B
′ is logically
equivalent to B, that B′ is composed of atomic sentences pi and pk, and that the
logical complexity of B′ is exactly one degree greater than that of B. Then, since one
degree of logical complexity does not change content if we are holding truth condi-
tions and component atomic formulas fixed, it follows that S believes B′.14
So, why doesn’t an analogous inductive argument establish that any logically
equivalent L-sentences would be mutually interchangeable in the complements of be-
lief ascriptions? The reason this argument does not generalize to any logically equiv-
alent L-sentences is simply that the inductive step would become false. The support
for the inductive step in the present argument is that adding degrees of logical com-
plexity to a sentence while holding everything else fixed amounts to a trivial rewording
of that sentence. But in a generalized version of the inductive step, everything else is
not held fixed—there is no prohibition against introducing new atomic sentences in
addition to the introduction of more logical complexity. But, in contrast to merely
14Recall that this was proposed as a plausible individuation condition for propositions in chapter 1,
section 3.
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introducing new degrees of logical complexity, examples like (8a)/(8b) above illustrate
that substituting the atomic sentences composing a complex sentence is sufficient to
induce a change in content. So, the cases in which our definition of content predicts
interchangeability in belief reports—cases in which truth-conditions and atomic con-
stituents are held fixed—seem to be harmless predictions of the theory. In fact, they
are just the cases we would expect to fall out of a nontrivial predictive theory of
propositional content.
3.3.4 A Solution to the Frege-Soames Puzzle
We show here how the present construction of contents can be used to solve the Frege-
Soames puzzle, which undermines worlds-based theories of propositional content at
least as much as logical omniscience phenomena.
Quantification
The solution to be given also serves to illustrate the way to extend the present se-
mantics, which only applies to the quantifier-free language L, to the language L∗ (L
with quantifiers). The semantic denotations of the connectives given in the previous
section lets connectives operate on the contents expressed by component sentences.
The content of conjunction, for example, is a function operating on the contents of
the component conjuncts, which are functions from partitions of W to {1, 0}. In this
way, we are able to ensure that the semantic types of connectives are sensitive to the
types of their component sentences. Since the semantic types of sentences are sensi-
tive to their parts, it should not be surprising that the semantic types of connectives
are required to shift depending on the components being connected. The approach of
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letting connectives operate on the contents of components suggests a way to extend
the present semantics to assign denotations to the quantifiers.
If quantifiers are to operate on contents of open sentences, it is necessary to first
explain what the content of an open sentence is supposed to be. So far, the only things
that have been assigned contents (functions from partitions of W to extensions) are
closed sentences and connectives. Let P (x) be an open atomic sentence of L. Rather
than letting ∃xP (x) and ∀xP (x) be built up by prefixing ∃x and ∀x, respectively, to
P (x), we will assume that the bare quantifiers ∃ and ∀ are prefixed to the predicate
abstract xP (x). This means that the bare quantifiers and xP (x) need to be assigned
semantic denotations such that one of them takes the other as an argument.15
How should we think about the content of the predicate abstract xP (x)? If we
think of its ordinary extension as that of an open sentence, its ordinary extension
would be a function that maps individuals to truth values—something of type 〈e, t〉.
This means that its ordinary intention would be a function from possible worlds to
functions of type 〈e, t〉. This suggests defining the content of xP (x) as a function
mapping cells of a partition of W to ordinary extensions. But what partition of W is
the content of xP (x) defined on in the first place? For clarity, lets assume that P (x)
is smokes(x). We can work backwards from the ordinary extensions of x [smokes(x)],
relative to possible worlds. In each possible world there is a set of individuals who
are smokers at that world; in some possible worlds everyone is a smoker, in others
nobody is a smoker. Let’s suppose that Jane and Bob are the only smokers at w.
There are other possible worlds that are like w in this respect. These worlds will
15We assume the English-like phrase structure of quantified first-order sentences given in Heim and
Kratzer (1998, ch 7.4). It is English-like insofar as it allows for a distinction between determiner
phrases—e.g. ‘every man’—and bare determiners—e.g. ‘every’.
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constitute one partition cell of W . In this way, the predicate abstract smokes(x)
can be said to induce a partition of W , where the equivalence relation corresponding
to the partition is the has-the-same-smokers-as relation. In general, if P is the ith
atomic predicate of L, we will let ws{i} denote an arbitrary member of the partition
of W induced by xP (x).
Given this way of identifying partitions of W based on predicate abstracts, we can
now define the content of the predicate abstract component of ∃xP (x).
(10) For Pi the i
th atomic predicate of L: Jx Pi(x)K∗ = λws{i} .λxe.∀w′ ∈ w:
(JwPiK¢(w′))(x) = 1.
The content of ∃xP (x), as planned, is defined as a function mapping cells of an ap-
propriate partition of W onto extensions.
This generalizes beyond atomic predicate abstracts in the obvious way. For ex-
ample, the predicate abstract x[smokes(x) ∧ drinks(x)] will induce a partition of W
given by the equivalence relation has-the-same-individuals-who-both-drink-and-smoke.
Under the partition of W induced by x[smokes(x) ∧ drinks(x)], two worlds w and w′
will be in the same partition cell just in case every individual that both drinks and
smokes in one is also an individual who drinks and smokes in the other. We have the
corresponding generalization of (15):
(11) Jx[φ(x)]K∗ = λwsΦ .λxe.∀w′ ∈ w: (JwPiK¢(w′))(x) = 1 (where sΦ denotes the
partition of W determined by the predicate abstract x[φ(x)])
Keeping with the strategy of letting the semantic denotations of connectives operate
on contents of components, we can now provide the recursive clauses for quantified
sentences, which are predicate abstracts with the bare quantifiers ∃ and ∀ prefixed:
(12) When affixed to a predicate abstract x[φ(x)] of type 〈sΦ, 〈e, t〉〉:
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a. J∃K∗ = λf〈sΦ,〈e,t〉〉.λws{i} . {x : f(w) = 1} is non-empty.
b. J∀K∗ = λf〈sΦ,〈e,t〉〉.λws{i} . {x : f(w) = 1} is the domain of all individuals.
It is not hard to see that the contents of quantified sentences have the types corre-
sponding to the types of their embedded predicate abstracts: J∃x[φ(x)]K∗ =
= J∃K∗(Jx[φ(x)]K∗)
= [λf〈sΦ,〈e,t〉〉.λws{i} .{x : f(w) = 1} is non-empty.](Jx[φ(x)]K∗)
= λws{i} .{x : Jx[φ(x)]K∗(w) = 1} is non-empty.
Hence, the content J∃x[φ(x)]K∗ has the type of Jx[φ(x)]K∗, which is simply 〈sΦ, t〉
Application
If proper names denote their referents rigidly, this raises semantic puzzles for everyone—
at least everyone who accepts that propositional attitude predicates relate agents to
propositional contents. Defenders of Russellian structured propositions no less than
defenders of unstructured propositions have to face Frege’s puzzle. Consider the
following principle of compositionality:
(13) (Comp) If S1 and S2 are non-intensional sentences or formulas with the same
grammatical structure, which differ only in the substitution of constituents
with the same semantic contents (relative to their respective contexts and as-
signments), then the semantic contents of S1 and S2 will be the same (relative
to those contexts and assignments).
For example, if the names ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ rigidly co-refer so that they
can be interchanged without inducing a change in content, the following express the
same content:
(14) a. Hesperus is the morning star.
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b. Phosphorus is the morning star.
Accordingly, (10a) and (10b) should be interchangeable salva veritate in belief con-
texts. This conflicts with the intuition that (11a) is true, but (11b) is false.
(15) a. The ancients believed that Hesperus is the morning star.
b. The ancients believed that Phosphorus is the morning star.
So, anybody accepting the relational theory of belief (and other attitudes) together
with direct reference, and the correlative commitment to the preservation of content
through substitution of co-referring names, faces this version of Frege’s puzzle.
The aim here is not to solve Frege’s puzzle in full generality but to show that
the devastating strengthening of Frege’s puzzle in ?, which undermines all theories
according to which propositions are unstructured sets of truth-supporting circum-
stances, does not touch our version of unstructured contents. Here is a quick review
of we have been calling the Frege-Soames puzzle. We start with some commitments
that are shared by defenders of unstructured contents:
(16) a. The semantic content of a sentence (relative to a context) is the collection
of circumstances supporting its truth (as used in the context).
b. Propositional attitude sentences report relations to the semantic contents
of their complements—i.e. an individual i satisfies ‘x vs that S’ (relative
to a context C) iff i bears an appropriate binary relation R to the semantic
content of S (relative to C).
c. Many propositional attitude verbs, including ‘say’, ‘assert’, ‘believe’, ‘know’,
and ‘prove’ distribute over conjunction.
d. Names, indexicals and variables are directly referential.
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Then, assuming that (17a) is true, we can derive the absurd conclusion (17d) with
the use of (16a)—(16d):
(17) a. The ancients believed the ‘Hesperus’ referred to Hesperus and ‘Phospo-
horus’ referred to Phosphorus. (Assumed)
b. The ancients believed that ‘Hesperus’ referred to Phosphorus and ‘Phos-
phorus’ referred to Phosphorus. (By (16a), (16b), (16d) and (Comp))
c. The ancients believed that ‘Hesperus’ referred to Phosphorus and ‘Phos-
phorus’ referred to Phosphorus, and there exists an x such that ‘Hesperus’
referred to x and ‘Phosphorus’ referred to x.”
d. The ancients believed that there exists an x such that ‘Hesperus’ referred
to x and ‘Phosphorus’ referred to x. (By (16c))
We are assuming that the complements of each of the belief ascriptions in (17a)—(17d)
can be expressed by appropriate L-sentences. If the contents of a given L-sentence
were identical with the set of possible worlds in which it is true, then, indeed, the
assumed truth (17a) would lead to the intuitive falsity (17d).
According to the semantic denotations of quantified sentences above, the inference
from (17b) would be (17c) invalid. If the truth-supporting circumstances were worlds,
possible or impossible, the justification for inferring (17c) from (17b) comes from a
principle about existential generalization:
(Gen) For all worlds w, a sentence φ is true at w only if ∃xφ is true at
w.
Indeed, (Gen) seems to be constitutive of existential quantification. However, if
sentential contents are defined as functions mapping partitions of W to truth values,
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the principle (Gen) would have to be reworded so as to quantify over partition cells
instead of quantifying over worlds directly.
(Gen*) Given a partition p of W , a sentence φ is true relative to a member
of p only if ∃xφ is true relative to a member of p.
Not only does the principle (Gen*) lack the intuitive appeal that motivates the prin-
ciple (Gen), but according to the semantics for existential quantification given above,
(Gen*) is false. Consider, for example, the atomic sentence ‘Bob runs’ and the cor-
responding atomic predicate abstract x [x runs]. The content of the ‘Bob runs’ is
a function defined on the partition of W consisting of exactly two cells—one cell
containing the possible worlds in which Bob runs and one cell containing the worlds
in which Bob does not run. The content of x [x runs] is a function defined on the
partition of W determined by the has-the-same-runners relation—the number of cells
of which is well beyond two (if there are, say, n possible runners, the number of cells
will turn out to be
∑n
k=0
(
n
k
)
= 2n). Since the domain of J∃x[x runs]K∗ is identical to
that of Jx[x runs]K∗, we know that the truth of ‘Bob runs’ relative to a partition cell p
does not entail the truth of ∃x[x runs] relative to p—so (Gen*) turns out to be false.
So a key inference in the argument (17a)—(17d) is invalid if sentential contents
are defined as being functions from appropriate partition cells to truth values. Other
ways around the Frege-Soames puzzle either leave analogous problems unsolved, or
are ad hoc denials of background assumptions like (Gen). For instance, if one rejects
(16d) by denying that proper names are rigidly denoting, the argument (17a)—(17d)
can be reformulated using only rigidly denoting indexical expressions.16 If one rejects
(16c) by claiming that belief fails to distribute over conjunction, then the argument
16See ?, section 4.
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(17a)—(17d) can be reformulated using any other propositional attitude predicate
that does distribute over conjunction (unless one is prepared to deny distributivity
over conjunction for all propositional attitude predicates). Moreover, the argument
(17a)—(17c) is sufficiently devastating independent of any assumptions regarding dis-
tribution over conjunction.
It should be noted that defenders of impossible worlds propositions are free to
reject (Gen), so that relative to some worlds a sentence can be true without the cor-
responding generalization being true.17 There are at least two problems with this
sort of ad hoc denial of (Gen). First, if, as argued in the previous chapter, impossible
worlds are supposed to model epistemic possibilities instead of arbitrary collections
of sentences, it is doubtful that such worlds should be counted among anyone’s epis-
temic possibilities. Second, it seems that there should be some independent reason
for rejecting (Gen) besides just its ineliminable role in the Frege-Soames puzzle. The
semantic framework developed in this chapter predicts this from more basic principles
about the individuation of propositional contents across sentences.
3.4 Open Questions
There are a few questions that are left open here for future work. For example, if
propositions really are individuated in part on the basis of the ordinary intensions of
atomic sentences, this raises the question of how the atomic sentences of a language are
to be circumscribed. The construction of contents based on appropriate partitions of
W presupposes something like the early Wittgensteinian atomistic thesis that all the
sentences of a language are composed of logically independent constituent sentences.
17See, for example, Priest (1987).
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In fact, Wittgenstein himself grew pessimistic about the possibility of specifying the
atomic constituents of a language:
I [believed that] the elementary propositions could be specified at a later
date. Only in recent years have I broken away from that mistake. At the
time I wrote in a manuscript of my book, “The answers to philosophical
questions must never be surprising. In philosophy you cannot discover
anything.” I myself, however, had not clearly enough understood this and
offended against it.18
Also, the color-exclusion problem and the possibility of non-logical necessary truths,
could prove to be problematic for the ideas developed here. If there are such relations
as necessary entailment or exclusion at the atomic level of a language (assuming there
is some appropriate circumscription of the atomic sentences in the first place), then
the granularity of contents defined here would seem to be too coarse from the start.
Recent work on the color exclusion problem aimed at rectifying a broadly Tractatarian
project could be useful in this regard—even if the philosophical aims are different from
those here.
We have also been presupposing that there is a genuine distinction between the
logical and non-logical expressions of a language such that the former are in some sense
content-neutral expressions. This presupposition is what supports the claim that
holding truth conditions and the atomic constituents of a sentence fixed, differences
in logical syntax do not induce a change in content. But, the precise connection
between, on the one hand, the supposed content neutrality of logical expressions and,
on the other hand, the fact that such differences in logical syntax preserve content
would need to be made more explicit in order to be a satisfying theoretical explanation
of the intuitive data. One way of making this connection more explicit would be to
18Waismann (1979, 182)
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survey various proposed criteria for demarcating the logical constants of a language
for the sake of drawing out possible predictions. Of course, any explicit predictions
of the insufficiency of distinctions in logical syntax as such for generating distinctions
in propositional content would help to ground the ideas developed here in other,
independently motivated, research projects.
Chapter 4
PARITY OF CLOSURE
CONDITIONS
4.0
Consider the following pair of candidate principles about rational belief and knowl-
edge:
(MPB) For any rational agent S, if S believes that A, and S believes
that A entails B, then S believes that B.
(MPK) For any rational agent S, if S knows that A, and S knows that
A entails B, then S knows B.
It is at least plausible that (MPB) is a normative ideal governing rational belief. It
is at least more plausible than the corresponding principle for knowledge (MPK).
After all, assuming knowledge entails some degree of justification, S’s justification
for believing the premises (that is, for believing that A and that A entails B), may
82
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only minimally qualify for S’s having knowledge. If that were the case, an inferred
conclusion depending on both premises would not be sufficiently justified to count as
an item of knowledge.
Second, consider the following candidate principles about rational belief and knowl-
edge:
(ConB) For any rational agent S, if S believes that A, and S believes
that B, then S believes that A and B.
(ConK) For any rational agent S, if S knows that A, and S knows
that B, then S knows that A and B.
Again, it seems possible to hold that (ConB) is a normative ideal governing rational
belief while denying (ConK). An agent’s knowledge set need not be closed under
conjunction introduction unless the sort of justification required for knowledge is
100% indefeasible.
What do these pairs have in common? They are candidate closure conditions for
rational belief and knowledge in which the belief versions are, at least prima facie,
much more plausible than the knowledge versions. It would, therefore, be a surprising
result if it turned out that, for any of these pairs, it is impossible to validate the
belief principle without thereby validating the corresponding knowledge principle.
Unfortunately, this is precisely what is predicted by the standard Kripke-style modal
treatments of knowledge and belief, even if we generalize the semantics to include
impossible worlds.
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4.1 Some Modal Semantics
Let L be a language generated from countably many atomic sentences pi together
with the usual logical constants (and parentheses) via the usual recursive clauses.
Let LB,K be a language identical to L except that its alphabet includes the sentential
operator BS (standing for “agent S believes that...”) and KS (standing for “agent
S knows that ...”), where well-formed formulas in the extended language LB,K are
generated in the obvious way. So LB,K is a basic propositional language enriched
with the sentential operators BS and KS.
The semantics for LB,K is more or less identical to the usual semantics for the
modal logic of necessity and possibility: A frame F is a triple (W , RB, RK) where W
is a set of possible worlds and where RB and RK are both subsets of W ×W . If either
RB or RK has a certain formal property, say RB is symmetric, we say that F is an
RB-symmetric frame, and similarly for other properties of RB and RK . A model M
over a frame F (= (W , RB, RK)) is a pair (F , φ) in which φ, the assignment function,
is a function from atomic sentences into P(W ) (the powerset ofM’s domain). Truth
of formulas in LB is defined relative to model-world pairs. Let M be a model over
F = (W , RB, RK) with assignment function φ and let w ∈ W . Then, for an LB,K-
formula α,M,w |= α (i.e. α is true in modelM at world w) is defined recursively as
follows:
For an atomic sentence α: M,w |= α ⇔ w ∈ φ(α)
For α = ¬ψ: M,w |= α ⇔ not M,w |= ψ
For α = (φ ∧ γ), (φ ∨ γ), (φ→ γ), (φ↔ γ):
M,w |= α ⇔M,w |= ψ and M,w |= γ
M,w |= α ⇔M,w |= ψ or M,w |= γ
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M,w |= α ⇔ If M,w |= ψ, then M,w |= γ
M,w |= α⇔M,w |= ψ if and only ifM,w |= γ
For α = BS(ψ): M,w |= α ⇔M,w′ |= ψ for all w′ such that
wRw′
For α = KS(ψ): M,w |= α ⇔ M,w′ |= ψ for all w′ such that
wRKw
′
An LB,K-formula α is said to be valid in a frame F if, for all models M over F and
all w ∈ M: M, w |= α. In particular, note that for any frame F , the LB,K-formula
(ψ → γ) is valid in F just in case for any model M over F , and any w in M’s
domain, M, w |= ψ only if M, w |= γ.1
Valid Inferences
Which inferences involving BS and BK are validated by the semantics depends in part
on the formal properties of RB and RK in the relevant models. For example, it is a
familiar fact that all formulas of the form KS(α)→ α are valid in all frames in which
RK is reflexive (call them RK-reflexive frames). And, conversely, if all formulas of
the form KS(α)→ α are valid in a class of frames, then in all members of that class,
RK is reflexive. But some inferences are validated regardless of any formal properties
1Proof : Suppose, for the left-to-right direction, that (ψ → γ) is valid in F and that, for some
arbitrary model M and world w: M, w |= ψ. Since, by assumption, (ψ → γ) is valid in F , it
follows that M, w |= (ψ → γ). Therefore, since M, w |= ψ and M, w |= (ψ → γ), it follows that
M, w |= γ.
For the right-to-left direction, suppose that for any model M over F , and any w in M’s domain,
M, w |= ψ only ifM, w |= γ, and letM∗ be an arbitrary model over the frame F . In order to show
that (ψ → γ) is valid in F , it is necessary to show that for all worlds w in the domain of F : M∗, w
|= (ψ → γ). Let w∗ be an arbitrary world in the domain of F . IfM∗, w∗ 2 (ψ → γ), then it would
have to be because M∗, w∗ |= ψ while M∗, w∗ 2 γ. But this is inconsistent with the supposition
that (ψ → γ) is valid in F , which is equivalent to the supposition that M, w |= (ψ → γ) for all
models M over F and all worlds w in the domain of F .
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of accessibility relations. The so-called logical omniscience properties of BS and KS
are valid in all frames:
(Omniscience) γ is a logical consequence of ψ ⇒ |= (BS(ψ)→ BS(γ))
γ is a logical consequence of ψ ⇒ |= (KS(ψ)→ KS(γ))
This is, in part, a consequence of the fact that, in all models, all the worlds in the
range of the accessibility relations corresponding to BS and KS are logically consis-
tent and complete. I will present a generalization of the semantics we have so far,
which invokes worlds lacking logical consistency and/or completeness—worlds that
are logically impossible.
Rantala’s Non-Normal Frames
Whereas a model over an ordinary frame F has a domain W consisting of only log-
ically possible worlds, a model over a non-normal frame F⊥ has non-normal worlds
in its domain.2 A non-normal frame F⊥ is a quadruple (W , N , RB, RK) in which
W is a set of worlds and N is a set of possible worlds. The set W − N is the set of
non-normal worlds3—worlds lacking the property of logical consistency and/or com-
pleteness. Both RB and RK are subsets of (W ∪ N) × (W ∪ N). As usual, a model
over the non-normal model is a pair (F⊥, φ) consisting of a non-normal frame F⊥
and an assignment function φ. The assignment function in non-normal models maps
pairs of worlds and sentences to truth values, where the values of complex sentences
at a possible world w are determined recursively from the values of atomic sentences
at w. But the assignment function φ is not recursively defined for sentences at non-
2See Rantala (1982)
3Non-normal worlds are the same as impossible worlds, but we’ll use ‘non-normal’ in order to be
consistent with the label for non-normal frames.
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normal worlds. Rather, the pair (w, α) gets assigned a value directly by φ for any
LK,B-formula α and w ∈ W −N .
Validity in a non-normal frame F⊥ is defined exactly as it is defined for validity
in ordinary frames. That is, ψ is valid in F⊥ just in case for all models M over F⊥
and normal worlds w (worlds in W −N) inM: M, w |= ψ. It is not hard to see why
we restrict attention to normal worlds; since non-normal worlds are impossible, we
do not expect them to be useful in modeling logically valid inferences. The utility of
non-normal worlds in a frame F⊥ is the fact that they can be in the range of F⊥’s
accessibility relations RB and RK .
4
Note that the logical omniscience properties are no longer valid in all frames, if
by “all frames” we mean to include non-normal frames. Consider a model M over a
non-normal frame such that its domain contains a pair of worlds (w, w′) where w is
normal and w′ is non-normal. Suppose that, even though γ is a logical consequence
of ψ, ψ is assigned the value 1 at w′ but γ is assigned the value false at w′. Let the
pair (w, w′) be a member of M’s accessibility relation for belief RB and let ψ be
assigned the value 1 at every other world that is RB-related to w. Then we have that
M, w |= BS(φ) but not M, w |= BS(γ) even though M, w |= ψ → γ.
4.2 Corresponding Closure Conditions
In this section we show that any closure property governing belief must also be valid
for knowledge according to the unified bimodal semantics above. We will assume,
4This is a somewhat subtle point. Non-normal worlds do feature in the definition of logical validity,
but only indirectly. We do not say, for example, a sentence S is valid in F⊥ if it is true in all models
over F⊥ and all worlds in the domain of F⊥—normal and non-normal. However, non-normal worlds
do exist in the domains of non-normal frames. These worlds can be in the range of accessibility
relations RK and RB , which is how they indirectly feature in the definition of validity
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conservatively, that the frames appropriate for modeling knowledge are exactly the
RK-reflexive/transitive/symmetric frames. This assumption is conservative because
the conclusion of the argument in this section is constrained by the set of formal
properties governing the RKs—in general, the stronger our assumptions about the
formal properties of the RKs, the weaker our results will be. Similarly with the acces-
sibility relations for belief. We assume, conservatively, that the frames appropriate
for modeling belief are RB-serial/transitive/symmetric.
5
Let α be an LB,K-formula. For any modelM, normal or non-normal, there will be
a set of worlds w in M’s domain such that φ(w, α) = 1. We use the double bracket
notation JαKM to denote this set of worlds. Recall that, by definition, an LB,K-
formula α is valid in all RB-serial/transitive/symmetric frames if for every modelM
over any such frame and any possible world w in the domain of M, φ(w, α) = 1
(where φ is the assignment function associated with the model M). This condition
is equivalent to the condition that JαKM is identical to the set of possible worlds in
M, for any model M over a RB-serial/transitive/reflexive frame. We will say that
a frame F is a Σ-frame if its doxastic accessibility relation RB is serial, transitive,
and euclidean and its epistemic accessibility relation RK is reflexive, transitive, and
symmetric. Consider the following assertion:
(∗) If, for any model M over a Σ-frame and for any L-formulas α, ψ, if
JαKM ⊆ JψKM, then the formulas ‘BS(α)→ BS(ψ)’ and ‘KS(α)→ KS(ψ)’
are valid in all Σ-frames.
The proof of (∗) is straightforward: If every model M over a Σ-frame is such that
JαKM ⊆ JψKM, then there cannot be any modelM′ over a Σ-frame such the subset of
5These assumptions about the formal properties of accessibility relations for knowledge and belief
operators are defended in Stalnaker (2006).
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possible worlds in JBSαKM′ is not a subset of the set of possible worlds in JBSψKM′ ,
otherwise there would have to be a possible world w and a world w′ (both in the
domain of M′) such that wRBw′ and φ(α,w′) = 1 and φ(ψ,w′) = 0 (where RB and
φ are the accessibility relation for belief and the assignment function in M′ respec-
tively). But that would mean w′ ∈ JαKM′ and w′ /∈ JψKM′ contra the assumption thatJαKM ⊆ JψKM for every model M over a Σ-frame. The proof that‘KS(α)→ KS(ψ)’
is also valid in all Σ-frames is the same.
We will say that an LB,K-formula is Σ-valid if it is valid in all Σ-frames. We now
have enough machinery to state and prove the first of our two main results:
(Closure 1) For L-formulas α, ψ: If ‘BS(α) → BS(ψ)’ is Σ-valid, then
‘KS(α)→ KS(ψ)’ is Σ-valid.
Here is the proof for (Closure 1): Suppose that ‘KS(α) → KS(ψ)’ is not Σ-valid.
Then, by (∗), it follows that there is some model M over a Σ-frame such that
JαKM * JψKM. That being the case, we can specify a new model M′ over a Σ-
frame based on the model M. Let w be a possible world in the domain of M′ and
let R′B be such that {w′ : wR′Bw′} ⊆ JαKM′ and {w′ : wR′Bw′} − JψKM′ 6= ∅. If M =
((W , RB, RK), φ), set M′ = ((W , R′B, RK), φ). A a graphical representation of the
construction of M′ from M is helpful. Here is a view of the relevant portion of the
model M (without {w′ : wRBw′}):
CHAPTER 4. PARITY OF CLOSURE CONDITIONS 90
w JαKM JψKM
Figure 5
And here is the relevant portion of M′ in which the shaded area represents {w′ :
wR′Bw
′}:
w JαKM {w′ : wR′Bw′} JψKM
Figure 6
In order to ensure that R′B is serial, transitive, and euclidean, we stipulate that for
any two worlds u and v in the range of R′B, the pair (u,v) is itself in R
′
B. So M′ is
a model over a Σ-frame in which BS(α) is true at the possible world w but BS(ψ) is
not true at w. It follows that the LB,K-formula ‘BS(α) → BS(ψ)’ is not Σ-valid, as
required.
This result is troubling because there seems to be no pretheoretical motivation
for the claim that if a particular inference preserves belief, then it also preserves
knowledge. In fact, this has the appearance of a fallacy. If we think of belief as,
in some sense, part of knowledge, then this would be an instance of the fallacy of
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composition—the thought that things inherit the properties of their proper parts.6
But the situation gets worse. With only some superficial qualifications, we can prove
the inverse of (Closure 1). Let ‘@’ denote the actual world in the “intended” model
MI of the language LB,K . We have the following result:
(Closure 2) For L-formulas α, ψ: If ‘BS(α) → BS(ψ)’ is false at @ in
MI and @ ∈ JαKMI , then ‘KS(α)→ KS(ψ)’ is not Σ-valid.
Here is the proof for (Closure 2): Suppose that ‘BS(α) → BS(ψ)’ is false at @
and @ ∈ JαK. By (∗) it follows that there is a model M over a Σ-frame in which
JαKM * JψKM. In fact, this model is MI itself. We will construct a model M′ over
a Σ-frame based on MI where KS(α) is true at @ but ‘KS(ψ)’ is not. Let R′K be
such that {w′ : @R′Bw′} ⊆ JαKM′ and {w′ : @R′Bw′} − JψKM′ 6= ∅. If MI = ((W ,
RB, RK), φ), set M′ = ((W , RB, R′K), φ). Again, a graphical representation of the
construction ofM′ fromMI might be helpful. Here is a view of the relevant portion
of the model MI (without {w′ : @RKw′}):
@ JαKMI JψKMI
Figure 7
And here is the relevant portion of M′ in which the shaded area represents {w′ :
6See, for example, Hales (1995) for an argument that the “parts” of knowledge (like belief) do
not necessarily inherit the closure properties of knowledge. Brueckner (2004) argues that under
relatively modest assumptions, any proposed counterexamples can be explained away.
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@R′Kw
′}:
@ JαKM {w′ : @R′Kw′} JψKM
Figure 8
In order to ensure that R′K is an equivalence relation, we stipulate that for any two
worlds u and v in the range of R′B, the pair (u,v) is itself in R
′
B. So M′ is a model
over a Σ-frame in which KS(α) is true at the possible world @ but KS(ψ) is not true
at @. It follows that the LB,K-formula ‘KS(α)→ KS(ψ)’ is not Σ-valid, as required.
4.3 Generalizations
Instead of discussing particular pairs of L-formulas, we can generalize the discussion
to rules of deductive inference that generate new L-formulas from old ones. Let ρ
be some rule of inference that operates on individual L-formulas—a single-premise
deductive rule. We will say that the belief operator BS is closed under the single-
premise rule ρ if the LB,K-formula ‘BS(α)→ BS(ψ)’ is valid in all Σ-frames whenever
the L-formula ψ follows from the L-formula α by a single application of the rule ρ—
and similarly for the knowledge operator KS. The following is an immediate corollary
of (Closure1):
(Corollary 1): For any single-premise deductive rule ρ if BS is closed
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under ρ, then so is KS.
To see why (Closure) implies (Corollary 1), assume that KS is not closed under the
rule ρ. Then there exists at least one pair of L-formulas α and ψ such that the LB,K-
formula ‘KS(α)→ KS(ψ)’ is not valid in all Σ-frames. By (Closure 1) it follows that
‘BS(α)→ BS(ψ)’ is not valid in all Σ-frames. But that is just to say that BS is not
closed under the rule ρ, as required.
The following generalization of (Closure 2) is similar:
(Corollary 2): For any single-premise deductive rule ρ, if there exist
L-formulas α, ψ such that ψ follows from α by an application of ρ, then
if @ ∈ JBS(α)KMI − JBS(ψ)KMI , then KS is not closed under ρ.
To see why (Corollary 2) follows from (Closure 2), assume that @ ∈ JBS(α)KMI −JBS(ψ)KMI . This is equivalent to the falsity of the formula ‘BS(α) → BS(ψ)’ at @.
It follows, by (Closure 2), that ‘KS(α)→ KS(ψ)’ is not Σ-valid. But since ψ follows
from α by an application of ρ, KS is not closed under ρ.
As it stands, we still do not have a very general result. After all, these two
corollaries only apply to deductive rules that operate on a single L-formula. We can
prove an analogous corollary about multi-premise deductive rules. We first need to
establish the following generalization of (∗).
(∗′) If, for any modelM over a Σ-frame and for any L-formulas α1, ..., αn, ψ,
if
⋂
i≤nJαiKM ⊆ JψKM, then the formula ‘(BS(α1)∧ ...∧BS(αn))→ BS(ψ)’
is valid in all Σ-frames.
We will skip the proofs of (∗′) because is a routine generalization of the proofs of (∗).
However, given (∗′), the following multi-premise version of (Closure 1) follows easily:
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(GC 1) For L-formulas α1, ..., αn, ψ, if the LB,K formula ‘(BS(α1) ∧ ... ∧
BS(αn)) → BS(ψ)’ is valid in all Σ-frames then so is the LB,K formula
‘(KS(α1) ∧ ... ∧KS(αn))→ KS(ψ)’.
The proof of (GC 1) is similar to that of (Closure 1): Suppose that ‘(KS(α1) ∧ ... ∧
(αn)) → KS(ψ)’ is not Σ-valid. Then, by (∗′) we have at least one model M over a
Σ-frame in which
⋂
i≤nJαiKM * JψKM. We construct a model M′ based on M. Let
w be a possible world in the domain ofM′ and let R′B be such that {w′ : wR′Bw′} ⊆⋂
i≤nJαiKM′ and {w′ : wR′Bw′} − JψKM′ 6= ∅. If M = ((W , RB, RK), φ), set M′ =
((W , R′B, RK), φ). A graphical representation of the construction of M′ from M is
helpful. Here is the relevant part of the model M:
w Jα1KMJα2KM ...JαnKM JψKM
Figure 9
And here is the relevant part of the model M′:
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w Jα1KMJα2KM ...JαnKM {w′ : wR′Bw′} JψKM
Figure 10
In order to ensure that R′B is serial, transitive, and euclidean, we stipulate that for
any two worlds u and v in the range of R′B, the pair (u,v) is itself in R
′
B. So M′ is
a model over a Σ-frame in which BS(α) is true at the possible world w but BS(ψ) is
not true at w. It follows that the LB,K-formula ‘BS(α) → BS(ψ)’ is not Σ-valid, as
required.
Similarly, we have a multi-premise version of (Closure 2). Again we let ‘@’ denote
the actual world in the intended model MI :
(GC 2) For L-formulas α1, ..., αn, ψ, if the LB,K-formula ‘(BS(α1) ∧ ... ∧
BS(αn))→ BS(ψ)’ is false at @ inMI , then the LB,K-formula ‘(KS(α1)∧
... ∧KS(αn))→ KS(ψ)’ is not Σ-valid.
The proof of (GC 2) is a routine generalization of the proof of (Closure 2).
We will say that the belief operator BS is closed under the multi-premise rule ρ if
whenever the L-formula ψ follows from the L-formulas αi by a single application of
the rule ρ, the formula ‘(BS(α1)∧ ...∧BS(αn))→ BS(ψ)’ is valid in all Σ-frames—and
similarly for the knowledge operator KS. We have the following generalization of (GC
1):
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(Corollary 3) For any multi-premise deductive rule ρ, if BS is closed
under ρ, then so is KS.
Suppose that ρ is an n-ary deductive rule and that KS is not closed under ρ. That
means that there are L-formulas α1, ..., αn, ψ such that ‘(KS(α1) ∧ ... ∧KS(αn)) →
KS(ψ)’ is not valid in all Σ-frames. (GC 1) implies that the sentence ‘(BS(α1)∧ ...∧
BS(αn))→ BS(ψ)’ is not Σ-valid. But that is just to say that BS is not closed under
the rule ρ, as required. Finally, we have a generalization of (GC 2). We will say
that the belief operator BS is actually closed under a multi-premise deductive rule ρ
if the formula ‘(BS(α1) ∧ ... ∧ BS(αn))→ BS(ψ)’ is true at @ in the intended model
MI whenever an L-formula ψ follows from L-formulas αi by an application of the
rule ρ.
(Corollary 4) For any multi-premise deductive rule ρ, if BS is not actu-
ally closed under ρ, then KS is not closed under ρ.
Suppose that ρ is an n-ary deductive rule and that BS is not actually closed under
ρ. That means that there are L-formulas α1, ..., αn, ψ such that ‘(KS(α1) ∧ ... ∧
KS(αn)) → KS(ψ)’ is not valid in all Σ-frames (since the intended model MI is a
model over a Σ-frame). (GC 2) implies that the sentence ‘(KS(α1)∧ ...∧KS(αn))→
KS(ψ)’ is not Σ-valid. But that is just to say that KS is not closed under the rule ρ,
as required.
Neither (Corollary 3) nor (Corollary 4) are very attractive results. They estab-
lish that on a generalization of the accepted model-theoretic semantics for belief and
knowledge, we cannot validate closure properties of belief without thereby being com-
mitted to the same closure properties for knowledge, and vice versa. Since there seems
to be no pre-theoretical motivation for this result, it would be convenient if there were
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an easy fix. In the next section I show that in principle an ad hoc fix is available
which allows for denying part of the proof of (Corollary 3). However, this requires
some substantive revision of the semantics and is a non-starter for undercutting the
proof of (Corollary 4).
4.4 Restricting Metalinguistic Quantification
We have so far made use of the assumption that nothing restricts the domain of the
quantification on the right side of the truth-at-a-model/world conditions of knowledge-
ascribing formulas of the form KS(ψ):
(KS) M,w |= KS(ψ) ⇔ M,w′ |= ψ for all w′ such that wRw′
That is, nothing restricts the domain of quantification except for the restriction im-
posed by the model’s doxastic accessibility relation RB. Of course, there are restric-
tions on the relation of RK (i.e. in any Σ-frame, RB must be reflexive, transitive,
and symmetric), and these in turn impose restrictions on the range of RK from any
given possible world w. Any such restriction on the range of RK in turn imposes a
restriction on the domain of quantification on the right-hand side of KS. In the proof
of (Closure 2), back in sect. 2, we were careful not to violate any formal constraints
on the relation RK in any Σ-frame. But this raises the question, what constraints
could be imposed on an epistemic accessibility relation RK , such that the proof of
(Closure 2) is undercut?
There is another way of posing the same question that may have slightly more
intuitive appeal. Let S’s epistemic space at w be the set of all worlds that are RK-
related to a possible world w (remember that RK is always defined relative to an agent
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S). We can think of S’s epistemic space at w as the set of worlds that are, in some
sense, compatible with what S believes at w.7 So, of course, among the worlds that
are excluded from S’s doxastic space at w are all those worlds that are incompatible
with, or ruled out by, what S believes at w. But the agent S can have different beliefs
across different possible worlds and across different models. This raises the following
question: what sorts of worlds are consistently ruled out as being members of S’s
doxastic space in any model M and any possible world w? That is, what sort of
world is, independent of an S’s beliefs at a particular world, a candidate for member-
ship in S’s doxastic space. So far we have not imposed any special restrictions in this
regard. Suppose, then, that we impose the following restriction on models in which
‘ρ’ denotes some deductive rule of inference:
(KS-restriction) For any modelM and possible world w inM’s domain,
if w′ ∈ {w′ : wRKw′}, then w′ is ρ-complete.
Call any Σ-frame in which (KS-restriction) holds a Θ-frame. If indeed (KS-restriction)
is a proper restriction of S’s epistemic space—if there is no way for a world to be
epistemically accessible for S without being ρ-complete—then the class of frames
relevant for modeling knowledge is just the class, or some further restricted subclass
of, Θ-frames. Here is the point: (Closure 3) does not admit of a proof of the sort
given for (Closure 2) in sect. 2.
(Closure 3) For L-formulas α, ψ: If ‘KS(α) → KS(ψ)’ is Θ-valid, then
‘BS(α)→ BS(ψ)’ is Θ-valid.
In fact, (Closure 3) is false, and it is not hard to see why. We have imposed an ad
hoc constraint on doxastic accessibility that need not apply to epistemic (knowledge-
7See Hintikka (1969) for details on the compatibility relation.
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based) accessibility. In particular, if ψ follows from α by an application of the rule
ρ, then the antecedent of (Closure 3) is true, while its consequent is false if there are
any Θ-models whose domains include ρ-incomplete worlds.
Before pursuing this option, we should ask why (Closure 1)/(Closure 2) and
(Corollary 3)/(Corollary 4) are such unattractive results. It was shown that un-
der very weak assumptions, the worlds-based models of propositional attitudes are
incapable of making fine distinctions between various attitude predicates. But are
these genuine distinctions? Recall from the opening section the “candidate” closure
principles for belief and knowledge:
(MPB) For any rational agent S, if S believes that A, and S believes
that A entails B, then S believes that B.
(MPK) For any rational agent S, if S knows that A, and S knows that
A entails B, then S knows B.
We skipped giving an argument for the truth of (MPB) and the falsity of (MPK) for
the sake of avoiding some unnecessary philosophical scruples prior to more important
material. But, it is precisely the fact that there are cases such as (MPB) and (MPK)
illustrating the asymmetry of closure conditions between distinct attitude predicates
that make (Closure 1)/(Closure 2) and (Corollary 3)/(Corollary 4) troubling in the
first place; so an intuitive argument for this asymmetry of closure conditions would
be useful.
The principle (MPB) is about ideally rational epistemic agents. Since its scope
is limited to such agents, the counterexamples typically proposed would not be rele-
vant (i.e. imagine an agent who believes a conditional together with its antecedent,
but fails to believe its consequent). This is not to say that it is impossible for Vann
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Mcgee-type rational agents to believe both P and “if P , then Q” while rejecting Q.8
It is possible, after all, that Vann Mcgee is mistaken about the logic of “if, then” while
maintaining rationality. But modeling the propositional attitudes of ideally rational
agents is always relative to some presupposed background logic. If, when all truths
are revealed, Vann Mcgee turns out to be correct about the logic of “if, then” so
that modus ponens turns out to be an invalid inference form, this would entail that
the presupposed background logic in our models should change to accommodate this
fact. As of now, since Vann Mcgee is more or less a voice in the wilderness concerning
the invalidity of modus ponens, a model of epistemic rationality should presuppose
a background logic according to which rational belief patterns according to modus
ponens. In particular, assuming that modus ponens is a valid inference form, Vann
McGee’s doxastic behavior cannot be modeled as ideally rational if he indeed believes
a conditional and its antecedent, but rejects its consequent. In general, this explains
how (MPB) could be true without denying the rationality of deviant logicians nor
denying that they believe what they believe—deviant logicians can be considered ra-
tional “from the outside” but not modeled as rational in a formal framework which
presupposes a fixed background logic.
Given that we are limiting attention to rationally ideal epistemic agents, the argu-
ment for the falsity of (MPK) is not as simple as pointing to cases in which an agent
knows a conditional and its antecedent, but fails to know its consequent in virtue
of failing to believe it. Since, we will assume, knowledge entails belief, knowing a
conditional and its antecedent entails believing them, but then by (MPB), knowing a
conditional and its antecedent entails believing the consequent. If (MPK) if false, it
8See McGee (1985).
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is not because belief is not closed under believed entailment.
Consider a sequence of, say, 100 sentences φ1, ..., φ10. The φis jointly entail the
conjunction ∧φi. It is possible that some agent S knows all of the φis individually
without knowing their conjunction. Unless one is willing to hold that knowledge
entails absolute certainty, the justification for S’s belief in the φis can be less than
perfect. An adaptation of the preface paradox illustrates this point. In Makinson
(1965), the preface paradox is presented as a puzzle about rational belief. For any
particular sentence in a book, the author, having been sufficiently careful and reflec-
tive in writing, justifiably believes that that sentence is true. Nevertheless, the author
is also rational enough to hedge up front by conceding that not every sentence in the
book is true. That is, the author justifiably believes that not every sentence in the
book is true. This shows that justifiable belief does not seem to be closed under the
rule of conjunction. Suppose, moreover, that every sentence in the text is true so we
can say for any particular sentence in the book, the author knows of that sentence
that it is true. Since conjunction rule does not preserve justifiable belief, the author
does not know that every sentence in the book is true—even though, by assumption,
every sentence in the book is true and known by the author to be true. The following
principle is false:
(1) (Multi-Premise Closure) If, while knowing p1, ..., pn, S believes q on the
basis of deducing it from the pis, the S knows q.
In other words, knowledge is not preserved under multi-premise entailment.
This is the sort of consideration suggesting that not all propositional attitude
predicates share the same set of closure properties. One might object by pointing out
that knowledge is not preserved by the rule of conjunction only insofar as rational
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belief is not preserved by rule of conjunction. So, the preface paradox cannot be used
to show how the closure properties of knowledge and idealized belief predicates can
diverge. But this is a confusion. Our assumption is that idealized belief is belief that
patterns according to logical consequence in the following sense: ideally, an agent
does not believe the premises of a valid argument without believing its conclusion.9
Note that this accommodates non-monotonicity—if an ideal agent comes to disbelieve
the conclusion of a valid argument, then that agent will come to disbelieve at least
one premise of the argument. This is using the notion of ideal belief not in the sense
of having perfect justification. Ideal belief in the relevant sense is just the sort of
belief that patterns according to logical consequence. If the relevant sense of ideal
belief meant something like having perfect justification, then why not also require
that ideal belief is also true belief? That is, the sense in which ideal belief entails
certainty is also the sense in which ideal belief simply entails truth. Of course, we
want to distinguish ideal belief as such from perfectly rational and true belief. So
it is consistent to say that ideal belief is preserved, for example, under the rule of
conjunction, while knowledge is not. In particular, if the author in our adaptation
of the preface case is taken to be an ideal believer, then the author’s belief in each
individual sentence would entail a belief in the conjunction of all the sentences—which
is not to say that any of these beliefs are perfectly justified (otherwise they would
have to be true). And this is consistent with the claim that knowledge fails to be
closed under the rule of conjunction.
Moreover, the asymmetry of closure properties between knowledge and belief is not
relegated to multi-premise arguments. We can re-use the previous argument, which
9Field (2009) argues that this is part of the normative role of logic in constraining rational belief.
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depends on preface-type cases, in order to show that (MPK)—which say knowledge
is closed under single-premise known entailment—is false. In particular, since we are
supposing that we are dealing with ideally rational agents who believe the logical
consequences of their beliefs, the following more precise version of (MPK) is what is
at issue:
(2) (Single-Premise Closure) If, while knowing p, S believes q by inferring it
from the knowledge that p entails q, then S knows q.
This principle turns out to be equivalent to the assumption that knowledge is closed
under multi-premise entailment if we assume that the relevant agent knows some basic
facts about entailment and conjunction. But if that’s the case, then the reasons for
thinking that knowledge is not closed under multi-premise entailments are also reasons
for thinking that knowledge is not closed under single-premise known entailment—
which suggests that (MPK) is false.
(Multi-Premise Closure) entails (Single-Premise Closure) because the latter is a
special case of the former. We will show that the converse is also true under weak
assumptions. Here is the reasoning: Suppose that S knows the following logical truth.
(3) (p1 → (p2 → (p3 → ...(pn → (p1 ∧ ... ∧ pn)...)
Suppose also that S knows each of the pi’s and that, from (3) together with the
knowledge that p1, S infers the consequent of (3), namely:
(4) (p2 → (p3 → (p4 → ...(pn → (p1 ∧ ... ∧ pn)...)
By (Single-Premise Closure), it follows that S knows (4). Now repeat this reasoning
n times. It follows that S knows the conjunction (p1 ∧ ... ∧ pn).10
10This argument was developed over a conversation with Jonathan Livengood.
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The only assumption made—in addition to the assumption of (Single-Premise
Closure) for the sake of reductio—is that the agent S knows (3) and believes the re-
sult of repeated applications of modus ponens. At each step (Single-Premise Closure)
guarantees that S knows the conclusion of the modus ponens inference. If cases like
the preface paradox show that (Multi-Premise Closure) is false, the argument here
shows that these cases also falsify (Single-Premise Closure). Although the argument
does not specify which of the n applications of (Single-Premise Closure) yields a falsity
from a truth, we know something has gone wrong—(Single-Premise Closure) together
with the harmless auxiliary assumption that S knows (3) generates the implausible
instances of (Multi-Premise Closure).
If the arguments in this section are sound, the fact that familiar worlds-based
semantics for propositional attitudes makes all attitude predicates the same with re-
spect to their closure properties is not a happy result. Is it possible to solve this
problem by stipulating from the outset that there will be a restriction on the sets of
worlds that are in the range of epistemic (knowledge-based) accessibility relations?
The beginning of this section describes the way this solution would work. It would
be constitutive of epistemic accessibility relations that, in any frame F and modelM
over F there are certain worlds in the domain of F that are barred from membership
in the range of the epistemic accessibility relation of F . This would ensure “from
the outside” that there are certain inference forms that preserve knowledge that need
not preserve belief. For example, we could stipulate that there can be no model M
over frame F such that there are members of the range of F ’s accessibility relation
which, in M, support the truth of φ and (φ → ψ) without supporting the truth of
ψ. Under such a stipulation, we guarantee that knowledge predicates obey (MPK)
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without thereby guaranteeing that belief predicates obey (MPB).
Of course, this is precisely the sort of asymmetry between belief and knowledge
that we would want. The arguments developed above were aimed at establishing
the existence of some inference patterns that are belief-preserving without also being
knowledge preserving. A formal stipulation that guarantees there are no inference
patterns preserving knowledge that aren’t also belief preserving would help. That is,
the falsity of (Closure 3) is precisely what we would want in order to solve the present
problems.
The worry is that this “solution” is more revisionary than it might seem. Ordi-
narily the closure properties of modal operators fall out of set-theoretic properties of
accessibility relations which are supposed to hold across a class of frames. For exam-
ple, the sentence Ks(φ)→ φ is valid in all frames in which the doxastic accessibility
relation is reflexive. The expression Ks is being interpreted as a knowledge operator
in all such frames. In order to study and generate interesting results about the logic of
knowledge, we restrict attention to frames whose epistemic accessibility relations are
reflexive. Contrast that with the present strategy for forcing a divergence between clo-
sure properties of various propositional attitude predicates. Not only are we supposed
to restrict our attention to a particular subclass of frames—i.e. restricting attention
those those frames whose epistemic accessibility relations are equivalence relations,
and whose doxastic accessibility relations are serial, transitive, and euclidean—we
are also suppose to restrict attention to particular models defined over such frames.
Subclasses of models defined over particular types of frames become the primary ob-
ject of study. This sort of solution is revisionary insofar as it is paradigm-changing.
But insofar as it is paradigm-changing it is also ad hoc. Interesting logical properties
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of modal operators track differences at the level of frames, not models. The only
possible difference between any two models defined over a particular frame is that
they assign different truth values to sentence-world pairs. Restricting attention to
particular models within a fixed class of frames is analogous to restricting attention
to some but not all rows of a truth table—this is analogous to claiming that material
conditionals will always express tautologies whenever we are restricting attention to
rows in which the antecedent is true and the consequent is false.
Interestingly, though, there is no such ad hoc strategy that will work for falsifying
the converse of (Closure 3):
(Closure 4) For L-formulas α, ψ: If ‘BS(α) → BS(ψ)’ is Θ-valid, then
‘KS(α)→ KS(ψ)’ is Θ-valid.
We have not seen any proposed counterexamples to (Closure 4), but in principle
there is no obvious reason that it should hold.11 Here is why the present strategy of
imposing outside restrictions on the range of accessibility relations will not work to
falsify (Closure 4). Suppose that we impose the following restriction on models in
which ‘ρ’ denotes some deductive rule of inference:
(BS-restriction) For any modelM and possible world w inM’s domain,
if w′ ∈ {w′ : wRBw′}, then w′ is ρ-complete.
Now, since knowledge entails belief, in every model, all epistemically accessible worlds
will be doxastically accessible—every world that is compatible with one’s knowledge
will thereby be compatible with one’s beliefs (not vice versa unless all of ones’ beliefs
count as knowledge). So, the following subset relation obtains:
11cf. footnote 6.
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(5) {w′ : wRBw′} ⊆ {w′ : wRKw′}
The sentence KS(φ)→ BS(φ) will be valid in all frames that obey (5), and any model
over a frame that obeys (5) will be a model that makes the sentence KS(φ)→ BS(φ)
true. In order to falsify (Closure 4), we would want for there to be some model M
over a frame F (which obeys (5) such that the doxastically accessible worlds that are
ρ-incomplete while all epistemically possible worlds are ρ-complete. But, since that
would contradict (5), the strategy of stipulating ad hoc restrictions on the range of
accessibility relations could only work if there were frames in which (5) is false, in
which case the sentence KS(φ)→ BS(φ) would be invalid.
4.5 Possible Reactions
The results of the previous section are unattractive for the prospects of modeling
distinct propositional attitudes with worlds-based models. In previous chapters, the
aim was to model propositions themselves using appropriate partitions of the set of
possible worlds—a project that is orthogonal to the project of modeling propositional
attitudes. If the goal is to use formal machinery to predict the beliefs, inferences, and
belief updating behavior of idealized rational agents, then a definition of propositional
content which meets intuitively correct individuation constraints is not sufficient. For
example, the definition of propositional content in the previous chapter makes rela-
tively few predictions about the doxastic properties of idealized rational agents—it
does not even predict that epistemic agents must believe the basic logical truths. This
is not a shortcoming of the definition; it reflects the fact that a predictive model of
rational belief is different from a theory of propositional content.
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Perhaps it is a mistake to think that logical laws should play such a central role in
modeling rational epistemic agents. If, contra the proposal in the previous chapter,
propositions are maximally fine-grained so that no two sentences express the same
one, then a relational account of the propositional attitudes would not preclude ratio-
nal agents from holding radically inconsistent combinations of beliefs. So, if a fixed
set of logical laws should not be taken to govern rational belief, the results of the
previous section would not undermine the prospects of modeling rational epistemic
agents using modal semantics after all.
One reason to think that rational belief is not constrained by logical laws comes
from Williamson (2008). The thought that logical laws govern rationality depends on
the intuition that, for some sentences (or inferences between sentences), understand-
ing entails assent—not just for normatively idealized agents, but for any linguistically
competent agent. Williamson’s strategy for resisting this claim is to consider indi-
vidual examples of such sentences (and inferences), and to show how it is possible to
have understanding without assent. Here is one example to get a feel for his strategy:
Consider the sentence ‘All vixens are vixens’. At first blush, it seems that there is no
way to understand it without assenting. This sentiment is expressed in the following
principle:
(6) Necessarily, whoever understands the sentence“Every vixen is a vixen” assents
to it.
Williamson asks us to consider a person, Peter, who withholds assent to ‘Every vixen
is a vixen’ because Peter thinks that the determiner ‘every’ carries existential import.
That is, he thinks that the sentence ‘Every vixen is a vixen’ entails that there is at
least one vixen. Peter also buys into a conspiracy theory according to which there
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are no foxes. Because of this, he does not assent to ‘There is at least one vixen’—nor
does he assent to anything he thinks implies it. In particular, Peter does not assent
to ‘Every vixen is a vixen.’ In a somewhat similar case, Stephen withholds assent
to ‘Every vixen is a vixen’, but because of matters having to do with the vagueness
of the predicate ‘vixen.’ Stephen thinks that there are intermediate species between
foxes and non-foxes such that predicating vixen to the females of such species yields
neither a truth nor a falsity. Steven also accepts strong three-valued logic K3 in
Kleene (1938), so he does not assent to ‘Every vixen is a vixen.’
The question is whether Peter and Stephen suffer from linguistic incompetence,
or whether they simply hold false views about a sentence they both genuinely un-
derstand. The fact that (1) entails that they do not understand the sentence ‘Every
vixen is a vixen’ is, according to Williamson, a counterintuitive result. After all,
they are both clearly competent in the use of the constituent expressions ‘Every’,
‘vixen’, and ‘is a’. A better explanation, according to Williamson, is that Peter and
Steven’s rogue metalinguistic commitments about the logic of ‘every’ is a mistake that
sometimes propagates through to their non-metalinguistic judgments. These rogue
metalinguistic judgments are what explain their unwillingness to assent to ‘Every
vixen is a vixen’, not a failure to understand the sentence. In Williamson’s words:
Their non-metalinguistic unorthodoxy as to when every F is a G is not
ultimately derived by semantic descent from metalinguistic orthodoxy as
to when “Every F is a G” is true; rather their metalinguistic unorthodoxy
is ultimately derived by semantic ascent from their non-metalinguistic
unorthodoxy. (Williamson (2008, 90))
This scenario is intended to show that a linguistically competent agent can hold a false
belief (perhaps irrationally) about a paradigm analytic truth. Williamson goes on to
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provide a similar analysis of cases of assent to the premises of paradigm classically-
valid inferences, modus ponens and conjunction elimination, without assent to their
conclusions. That is, a similar argument is given against the truth of the following
principles:
(7) Necessarily, whoever understands and assents to a sentence of the form ‘If P ,
then Q’ together with P assents to Q.
(8) Necessarily, whoever understands and assents a sentence of the of the form ‘P
and Q’ assents to both P and Q individually.
How does this help to loosen up the connection between logic and rational belief?
There are three steps. First, if Williamson is correct, then it is possible to genuinely
believe logical absurdities, which includes believing the premises of simple classically
valid arguments without believing the corresponding conclusions. The second step is
to notice that the cases Williamson uses to illustrate this point are cases in which
there is nothing particularly irrational about the relevant beliefs. In the first case,
Peter rejects the sentence ‘Every vixen is a vixen’ because of a rather sophisticated
belief about the logic of ‘every’. For one to hold, with Aristotle, the view that ‘every’
carries existential commitment certainly need not entail that one is irrational—even
if we suppose that this semantic account of ‘every’ is, in fact, incorrect. In general,
false beliefs about the semantic properties of common expressions does not entail
irrationality. One might point out that Peter’s acceptance of the conspiracy theory
according to which there are no female foxes seems irrational. Fair enough. But this
kind of irrationality—concerning matters of fact, rather than matters of logic—is not
what’s relevant here. Steven’s belief that borderline cases lack truth values and that
K3 gets the right results with respect to truth value gaps is similar. That is, one’s
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commitment to this view of vague predicates does not in itself seem to entail that
one is irrational. The third step is to recognize that not only are these not cases
of irrationality, but they are illustrations of a kind of ideal rationality. One’s view
of rational belief should be consistent with the fact that rational agents can have
rational disagreements over logical matters.
Does it follow that the results of the previous sections are unimportant since mod-
els of rational belief imposing logical laws are mistaken? Not exactly. For one reason,
Williamson’s arguments seem to presuppose an inferentialist account of linguistic un-
derstanding, according to which competence in the use of some expression is sufficient
for understanding that expression. But, of course, it is not difficult to imagine cases in
which a person competently uses an expression without understanding it. Moreover,
the cases used to illustrate the possibility of genuine belief in logical absurdities seem
to be cases in which rogue metalinguistic commitments are precisely what contami-
nate an agents’ otherwise competent use of an expression. Precisely the cases used to
illustrate the possibility of logically absurd beliefs are those cases in which the agent
displays some lack of competence with the relevant expressions.
The other option is to accept that coarse-grained possible worlds propositions are
hyper-idealized analogues of genuine propositions of the sort that ordinary agents
stand in cognitive relations with. They are hyper-idealized not just because of omni-
science phenomena, but also because they determine that ideally there is no difference
between the closure properties of knowledge and belief predicates (or any other propo-
sitional attitude predicate with the same formal treatment as knowledge and belief
predicates). This sort of parity between distinct propositional attitude predicates is
an unattractive artifact of the formal analysis, but this leaves open the question of
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whether possible worlds propositions are at least idealized approximations of genuine
content. Why, and under what conditions, would it follow from the fact that an
idealized model of some phenomenon only approximates the empirical phenomenon,
that the objects involved in the model cannot be an idealized analogue of the objects
under investigation? After all, isn’t idealization of some sort or other, to some degree
or other, just a part and parcel theoretical modeling?
From the mere fact that laws of Newtonian mechanics are conditional on ide-
alizations such as frictionless planes and rigid bodies, it does not follow that the
real physical world with its imperfectly smooth planes and non-rigid bodies is not
the real subject under investigation—rather, idealized physical systems are idealized
analogues of real physical systems. In the same way, intensions are to be seen as ide-
alized analogues of propositions. The degree to which a semantic theory only applies
to normatively ideal agents is precisely the degree to which its intensions are merely
approximations of real propositional contents. While the real propositional contents
are the things we actually believe, know, doubt, assert, etc., there is no reason to
think that an intensional semantic theory of these attitudes is not dealing with mod-
els of real propositional contents.
Since this is not the place to address the question of what justifies different sorts of
idealization in science, I will simply focus on two of the most widely discussed modes
of idealization. I follow Weisberg (2007) in the use of labels Galilean and minimalist
idealization. This response is no doubt too quick to do justice to the complexities of
idealization in science, but it is enough to get a general impression of why I think
this cannot not a good route for defending maximally ideal theories of propositional
content.
CHAPTER 4. PARITY OF CLOSURE CONDITIONS 113
Galilean idealization is done with the intent of simplifying theories for practical
computational purposes. Since modeling real-world phenomena can easily become
computationally intractable, it is useful and justifiable to stipulate some falsities for
the sake of gaining computational tractability. This pragmatic justification is supple-
mented by the fact that as our means of computation increases with technology, we
can afford corresponding de-idealizations of the theory. With respect to theories of
belief and propositional content, the suggestion is that perhaps idealizations can be
given a broadly Galilean justification. But clearly a Galilean justification for idealiza-
tion does not apply in this case. A defender of idealized coarse-grained propositions
is not idealizing away irrational epistemic agents for the sake of gaining anything like
computational tractability. The defender of coarse-grained propositions has to ideal-
ize away from irrational agents in order to be able to make any non-trivial predictions
about belief—computationally tractable or not.
Another mode of idealization that might be more relevant is minimalist idealization—
according to which false assumptions are made about irrelevant factors in order to
isolate the particular phenomenon that is up for explanation. Consider, for example,
the Ising model, according to which atoms and molecules are crudely represented as
unanalyzed points which can be in one of two states. If nothing more about the
fine structure of atoms and molecules is needed for an explanation a particular phe-
nomenon of interest, then it is justifiable to abstract away from such detail.12.
Is the minimalist mode of idealization a suitable picture of what is happening
in idealized theories of belief and propositional content? The suggestion would be
that the fact that there are irrational epistemic agents because of irrelevant matters
12The version of minimalism in Strevens (2004) amounts to a model according to which it is justifiable
to ignore anything that does not count as a “difference-making” factors
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having to do with psychological limitations or whatever, means that it is justifiable
to (falsely) assume, for the sake of isolating belief and propositional content as such,
that such epistemic agents do not exist. So, just as idealized mechanical theories use
frictionless planes, idealized belief theories invoke epistemic agents who lack “cogni-
tive friction.”
The trouble is that this appeal to minimalist idealization justifies far more than
intended. In fact, if we are abstracting away from all matters irrelevant to belief and
content as such, then why not ignore all contingent limitations for the sake of isolat-
ing the target phenomenon? It is not as if there is a relevant difference between, on
the one hand, the psychological factors leading to logically inconsistent or incomplete
belief sets, and, on the other hand, the fact that there is only a finite amount of time
before the impending heat death of the universe (and, not to mention, a finite upper
bound on human brain’s computational capacity). So, what justifies abstracting away
from the former but not from the latter? If anything, contingent psychological facts
about humans are more relevant to belief as such than are these nebulous facts that
make us less than universal Turing machines.
But of course, idealizing away any of these constraints on belief, the constraints
determining that we are less than perfect epistemic agents, results in a theory accord-
ing to which epistemic agents are logically omniscient. The defenders of such theories
are not my target in this chapter.13
13cf. chapter 1 above.
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